The role of Islamic radicalisation in Kashmir Unrest.

Religious radicalization has its growing influence in the State of Jammu & Kashmir. Majority of the Muslim youth in the Kashmir Valley is increasingly inclining towards extremist political, social and religious ideas repudiating and challenging the status quo. There has been a sudden heave in Pan-Islamism in Kashmir’s Muslim society gradually marginalizing an initial pro-nationalist agenda of insurgency. Rabidly fanatical clerics are indoctrinating the youth with Wahhabi ideology, whereby they reject the old Kashmiri tradition of people visiting and paying obeisance at the shrines of popular saints (Sufis and Rishis), terming it a violation of the teachings of Islam.

The youth are told that it is the duty of Muslims to capture power and impose Sharia law (Islamic Law), which disapproves democracy and legitimizes holy war (jihad) as means for establishing an Islamic Caliphate. Misuse of social media by the jihadist has exacerbated radicalization, posing more challenges to the security of the State.

The type of Islam which Kashmiris have accepted since centuries is a variant of Sufism –  different from political Islam – in which Muslim Sufi saints preached pluralism and tolerance of other faiths. Jihad oriented insurgency in Kashmir purged Kashmiri society of its indigenous characteristics, as Pakistan funded and propagated radical – and militant Islam made deep inroads into the Kashmiri society. Pakistan-based jihadi groups like Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Harkat ul Ansar, Markaz Dawa-wal-Irshad and its militant wing Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) have become extensively active in the Kashmir Valley as they found it easy to mislead the gullible people in Kashmir.

Pan-Islamism, essentially upholding the concept of Ummah (Islamic community), rejects national boundaries for an Islamic Caliphate. This idea has been drilled into the heads of militants and hence violence and mayhem in the Valley of Kashmir are direct consequences of it. Islamist extremists pose a challenge to the pluralistic social order, interfaith harmony and peaceful coexistence among various communities while it gravely obstructs construction of secular and democratic polity in the region.

Hindsight of emerging political identity

The year 1931 witnessed the rise of a massive nationalist movement against Dogra rule in the context of feudal bondage. It was an endeavour by the oppressed people against a repressive regime; they wanted to shape their destiny and of their coming generations. On 12 November in the same year, the last ruler of the Dogra dynasty, Maharaja Hari Singh appointed a Commission to enquire the reasons for unrest and grievances of the Muslim community. The Commission was headed by Sir G.B. Glancy, an official of the Foreign and Political department of the British Government of India, and the Commission recommended a slew of reforms like in the administrative structure and representation of Muslims in service, which the Maharaja implemented. The Pandits initiated an agitation against these recommendations referred to as the ‘Roti agitation’, led by a Pandit social organization called, ‘Yuvak Sabha’, which succeeded in warding off reservation of employment on communal basis.  However, it soon lost its momentum and ceased to be an independent political movement.

In 1932, popular Kashmiri leader, Sheikh Abdullah, formed the first political party of Jammu & Kashmir, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, to project the rights and aspirations of the Muslim community. The party focused on Kashmir peasantry, artisans and working class groaning under the burden of taxes levied by the Maharaja. The All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference also prompted the formation of the ‘Kashmiri Pandit Conference’and the ‘Hindu Sabha’ in the State. As President of the Muslim Conference, Sheikh Abdullah appealed for a non-communal struggle aimed at putting an end to the suffering of all communities and securing a responsible government.

“Our country’s progress is impossible so long as we do not establish amicable relations with other communities”, Sheikh Abdullah, while addressing Muslim Conference in 1932.

“Let us all rise above petty communal bickering and work jointly for the welfare of the masses. I appeal to all Hindu brethren not to entertain imaginary fears and doubts. Let us assure them that their rights shall not be jeopardized if they join hands with their Mussalmans”, Sheikh Abdullah, while addressing masses, regardless of caste, creed or religion, 1935.

In order to secularize his organization and gain mass support, Sheikh Abdullah reconstituted Muslim Conference as National Conference in 1939. This started the ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement in 1946, a struggle against the Dogra oligarchy, which was based on the demand to set up a democratic government in the State with power vested in the hands of the people. The leaders of the earlier Muslim Conference condemned the Quit Kashmir movement and called it Sheikh Abdullah’s conspiracy (along with the Congress party) to disseminate Hindu hegemony in the State, however, the course of political development during the period 1939 to 1947 remained free from communal and violent leanings. As President of the National Conference, Sheikh Abdullah, in his speeches affirmed that his government would be a popular government of the people of the State regardless of their religion.

“In Kashmir, we want a people’s government. We want a government which will give equal opportunities to all men, irrespective of caste and creed. The Kashmir Government will not be the government of any one community. It will be a joint government of the Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims. That is what I am fighting for”, Sheikh Abdullah, President National Conference.

On 22 October 1947, Pakistan invaded both regions of the State, Kashmir and Jammu. The invaders were organized in company-level units and armed with lethal weapons. The invaders – hordes of tribesmen from the tribal areas of Pakistan – butchered defenceless Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, burnt houses, looted and destroyed properties and indulged in large-scale rape and abduction of women, many of who were forced to convert and marry in parts of Pakistan. The panic-stricken Maharaja, his handful of soldiers unable to withstand the onslaught of the invading hordes, made an appeal to the Government of India to come to his rescue. The Indian Government subjected military assistance to the Maharaja signing the formal Instrument of Accession, which the Maharaja signed.  

Consequently, India and Pakistan fought the first Kashmir war for more than a year, and on the midnight of 31 December 1948, a cease fire agreement was agreed which came into immediate effect. It reset the boundaries of the State, with which India gained control over almost two-thirds of the State of Jammu & Kashmir comprising Jammu, the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh, while Pakistan was left with large portions of western Jammu and Poonch, Skardu of Ladakh area and Gilgit Baltistan.

Maharaja Hari Singh and the National Conference both accepted the accession of the State of Jammu & Kashmir with India. International intervention from the United Nations (UN) made the accession of the State to India open with the option of a plebiscite, which Sheikh Abdullah also accepted, but this option could not be implemented since Pakistan did not fulfil the preconditions of holding a plebiscite (according to the UN Resolutions) which included withdrawal of its forces from the parts of the erstwhile princely State of Jammu & Kashmir, now controlled and administered by Pakistan.

In 1972, a year after the Bangladesh war that saw the liberation of East Bengal from the clutches of West Pakistani rulers, the people of the Valley prepared to endorse accession of the State to India. The Simla agreement between India and Pakistan, following the Bangladesh Liberation war, in which both sides agreed to settle any disputes by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations, had also rendered the UN Resolutions irrelevant. Abdullah announced, “our dispute with Government of India is not about accession but about the quantum of autonomy”. In February 1975, Sheikh Abdullah assumed power for the second time as the Chief Minister of the State after a gap of 11 years and an Accord was signed between the Prime Minster of India, Indira Gandhi, and Sheikh Abdullah, which further strengthened India’s control over legislation in Jammu & Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah remained the Chief Minister and a popular Kashmiri leader till his death in 1982.

Farooq Abdullah, who succeeded his father as Chief Minister, won a convincing victory against the Congress in 1983, which helped the people of the Valley to reaffirm their confidence in the Indian democracy. However, not happy with Farooq Abdullah’s waywardness, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi began destabilizing him and eventually Farooq Abdullah was dismissed on the grounds of his inability to prove majority support and allegations of covertly supporting anti-Indian elements in the Valley. The move angered the masses but there were no protests against Abdullah’s dismissal and his brother-in-law, Gul Mohammad Shah, replaced him.

Operation Topac: A Pakistani conspiracy (1984)

Pakistan has always vehemently denied any collusion in Jammu & Kashmir, despite contriving tribal incursion of the State in 1947 (First Kashmir war), 1965 (Operation Gibraltar) and most recently in 1999 (Kargil war). Pakistan had pre-planned an operation, referred to by several names viz. ‘Operation Topac’‘Kashmir Plan’ or ‘Zia Plan’ for initiating terrorism and unleashing a proxy war in the State of Jammu & Kashmir with an objective of making it a part of Pakistan. Operation Topac, a brain-child of President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan, had a three-phase action plan for covert support to armed insurgency in Indian Administered Jammu & Kashmir. Under the first phase, youth from Jammu & Kashmir were to cross the de facto border (Line of Control – LoC) to seek weapon training at various training camps in Pakistan Administered Jammu & Kashmir. During the second phase, called ‘Operation Stage’, the Pak-trained youth were expected to indulge in large scale subversive activities, like bomb blasts and shoot-outs, creating an atmosphere of terror and demoralizing the administration. The third phase, which was supposed to be the final stage of the operation, was to liberate the Muslim majority in the Kashmir Valley and establish an independent Islamic State.

“What Pakistan could not achieve through the wars of 1947-48, 1965 and 1971 had to be achieved through an amalgam of subterfuge, subversion, force and religious fundamentalism”, Jagmohan, an Ex-Governor of Jammu & Kashmir & Author of ‘My Frozen Turbulences in Kashmir’.

Amanullah Khan established the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a political organization, originally a militant wing of the Plebiscite Front in Pakistan Administered Jammu & Kashmir. In May 1984, Amanullah Khan, then the Chairman of JKLF, was contacted by Lt. Gen. Akhtar Abdul Rehman, a very close confidante and advisor of President Zia, the then head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the star of Pakistan’s campaign against Soviets in Afghanistan, to enlist the support of JKLF in initiating an insurgency in Indian Administered Jammu & Kashmir. The plan was finalized by 1986, and action started in July 1988. There are documentary evidences involving Pakistani based sources, corroborating their complicity in the violence in the Kashmir Valley. JKLF, supported by the Pakistani Army, established training camps in Pakistan Administered Jammu & Kashmir with plans of weapons training for the youth from the Kashmir Valley. In February 1990, Amanullah Khan in an interview to Zahid Hussain of Karachi monthly magazine Newline, said in reply to a question by a journalist, “How did you mobilize the uprising? Was it a long-term plan?”, replied; “Yes, it was… it had to be well prepared. So, we actually started political planning in 1986 and continued till the end of 1987 for one and a half years we were planning our strategy and it began in July 1988”.

Operation Topac, to be launched in 1991 had to be prematurely implemented owning to the sudden death of Zia-ul-Haq and General Akhtar in the air crash of 17 August 1988. General Zia-ul-Haq’s death in the said plane crash in Pakistan in 1988, triggered large scale rioting in Srinagar, Baramulla, Pulwama, Bhaderwah and Anantnag, which eventually became areas of militant strongholds. The process of blasting of bombs, holding demonstrations and rioting to whip up passions of local population continued till the end of 1988. In early 1990, Amanullah Khan, very explicitly said in an interview with Times London, that the uprising was a product of well laid plans and that the young men who crossed the LoC received weapons training through his organization based in Pakistan Administered Jammu & Kashmir

“We chose Srinagar and the Kashmir valley as the first stage of our attack, what has happened so far is the urban phase, mostly sabotage and hit and run tactics (phase one of ‘Operation Topac)”, Dr. Farooq Haider, Vice Chairman of the JKLF – revealed to the Economist (London).

Zia-ul-Haq’s obsessive passion for Jammu & Kashmir was very well known as he went on record shouting slogans “Kashmir Banega Pakistan” (Kashmir will become a part of Pakistan). Some observers opine that as the ‘Afghan Struggle’ against the Soviets during Zia-ul-Haq’s regime was nearing completion, Operation Topac was a very well-planned move to prolong his rule by involving the majority community of Kashmiri Muslims without repeating the mistakes committed in 1965. 

Alleged Rigged Election 1987 in Jammu & Kashmir

In 1986, Farooq Abdullah paradoxically concluded an accord with Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress and returned to power by striking an alliance with the party, which left the people of the Kashmir Valley somewhat disillusioned and confused. They once again thought that their trust had been betrayed, which was followed by communal riots the following year and a new political party, Muslim United Front, gradually began gaining strength. It was formally launched to safeguard the interest of Muslims and vitalize their identity and aspirations. MUF acquired motivation from various fundamentalist groups, their focus being Islamic solidarity and restoration of religious and political rights. The traditional shrine culture was repugnant to its doctrine and its affiliates too began Islamizing Kashmir politics. In 1987, MUF fought the elections on the identity of Muslim brotherhood, Kashmiri identity and the ideology of an Islamic State. Some observers suggest that the election was rigged by the Abdullah-Gandhi alliance and Muslim United Front believed that it received maximum votes and support compared to the National Conference that was declared the winner of the elections. With the declaration of the results, many people of the Valley lost faith in the democratic exercise and once again felt betrayed which again resulted in strikes and incidences of violence.

Terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir

In 1988, several secessionist leaders and Kashmiri youth crossed the LoC to Pakistan Administered Jammu & Kashmir, received weapons training and returned to the Valley, well prepared for an armed insurgency. Pakistani and Kashmiri religious parties and their militant squads were used as a front to escalate armed attacks in Jammu & Kashmir and succeeded in injecting the ideology of communalism in the Valley of Kashmir. Pakistan’s motive to annex and not to liberate Jammu & Kashmir, causing disintegration within India, is corroborated by the fact that a majority of the terrorist and separatist groups’ objective remained merger with Pakistan. A malicious campaign against the minority community, Kashmiri Pandits (Hindus), was launched by extremist Islamic terrorist groups using periodic write-ups in local newspapers, sermons through mosques, shouting slogans and referring to the minority community as non-believers (kafirs). A final ultimatum was given to this community through a press release on 14 April 1990, asking them to leave the Valley within two days or face death as reprisal. The entire community of about 350,000 Pandits of the Valley was ethnically cleansed and forced to flee their ancestral homeland. In this phase of militancy, the local Muslims who resisted, also bore the brunt of atrocities by Islamist terrorists and mercenaries as there was a massive propaganda drive against Sufi Islam and the composite Kashmiri culture, both dubbed as anti–Islamic.

The scattered generation of Kashmiri Pandits growing up outside their homeland is shaped in a different culture with almost no connection to their roots while on the other hand, the young generations of Muslims in Kashmir are growing up under the umbrella of a single religion, Islam, and constant fear. There being no reference of communal harmony, heritage or diversity of people that once existed in the idyllic Valley of Kashmir, the younger generation can barely imagine how their elders used to live with Kashmiri Pandits. After nearly achieving their aim of changing the structure of human population in the Valley, terrorists were successful in extending their subversive activities in Doda, Poonch and Rajouri districts of Jammu & Kashmir, where a series of Hindu massacres also led to the migration of the minority community.

With the objective of strengthening anti-terrorism operations, the Prevention Terrorism Act (POTA) was passed by the Parliament of India in 2002 and was also implemented in Jammu & Kashmir (later abolished by the government of Manmohan Singh in May 2014); security troops had the permission to blast a house if militants were found hiding inside it. To counter POTA, militants were seen hiding in mosques. In fact, there has been a proliferation of mosques in Kashmir. Cursory survey suggests that more than three thousand new mosques have been built across the Kashmir Valley since 1990, of which the architecture features domes and minarets, unlike earlier times when mosques had ceilings resembling Buddhist or Hindu temples. These mosques have provided jobs for hundreds of unemployed youth as preachers, priests and caretakers of the religious places and have also been used as a resting and hiding place for militants.

Emergence of Separatist Movements

Despite the evidences regarding Operation Topac, some believe that the alleged rigged elections in 1987 fostered disillusionment among the Kashmiri Muslim population, emboldening the youth to cross the LoC to receive arms training in ‘Azad Kashmir’ (Pakistan Administered Jammu & Kashmir). JKLF led by Amanullah Khan committed itself to the self-styled secular political struggle advocating secession of Jammu & Kashmir from India. Yasin Malik, along with Hamid Sheikh, Ashfaq Wani and Javed Ahmad Mir, formed the core group — dubbed the “HAJY” group — of the JKLF militants in the Kashmir Valley. The JKLF started its militant activities in the Valley and struck first on 31 July 1988 by exploding a bomb in Srinagar. On 8 December 1989, Dr. Rubiya Sayed, daughter of Union Home Minister Mufti Mohammad, was kidnapped by JKLF, which demanded the release of militants. Capitulating to the pressure, the government facilitated the release of militants thereby giving them new confidence and stimulating their movement. In March 1990, Ashfaq Wani was killed in a battle with Indian Security Forces and in August 1990, Yasin Malik was captured in a wounded condition and imprisoned until May 1994. Hamid Sheikh was also captured in 1992, but later released by the Border Security Force.

The organized struggle led by JKLF and supported by Pakistan was at its crowning in 1990, and took a violent turn resulting in abductions, senseless killings and other criminal activities. Once the insurgency was efficaciously launched, Pakistan decided to withdraw its support from JKLF, they being perceived to be committed to the independence of Jammu & Kashmir rather than its accession to Pakistan and as a result much of its squads had either been dispersed, destroyed or absorbed into other groups and the movement almost died down by 1993. Its leadership also split into factions, some of them renouncing militancy. HM, a pro-Pakistani Kashmiri Muslim terrorist group formed by Muhammad Ahsan Dar in 1989, marked the beginning of the second phase of the movement and its shift towards radical Islam. HM introduced jihad to rationalize political violence in the name of religion and at one point about 2,000 young militants were said to have been associated with HM. Pakistan facilitated the formation and promotion of various other terrorist groups which included Harkat ul-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, and LeT under the umbrella of Islamic jihad.

To impose the radical Islamic culture on Kashmiris, Pakistan initiated a strategy to convert the multi-cultural Kashmiri society into a hardcore Islamic one through the fear of gun. Many Sufi shrines and mosques were targeted by the Pakistan-backed militant outfits; In May 1995, the Islamist mercenaries from Afghanistan and Pakistan destroyed the ancient shrine of saint Noor-u-Din (Nund Rishi for Kashmiri Pandits)alled Chrar-e-Sharif. This shrine had been a center of pilgrimage for hundreds of thousands of devotees, both Hindus and Muslims, over the past six hundred years. Such brutal practices by Islamist terrorists, who exhorted the Kashmiri Muslims to banish these ‘un-Islamic practices’, as visiting ancient holy shrines of saints (Sufis/ Rishis), caused revulsion among the common masses in Kashmir.

Structural Changes in Kashmiri Society & Impact of Pan-Islamism

By early 1990, Jammu & Kashmir witnessed a trend of Pan-Islamism, clearing Kashmir Valley of the Hindu minority presence and young boys disposed to lay down their lives in the name of jihad. Separatist groups perceived as secular were abandoned by Pakistan, favouring other Islamist substitutions, when they started moving away from the Pakistani’s stance to see Jammu & Kashmir merging with Pakistan. Islamic terrorists endeavoured to bring structural changes at cultural levels of the Kashmir society since the inception of militancy, as in the year 1989 and in the early 1990s there was a mushroom growth of militant organizations in Kashmir advocating ‘Nizam-e-Mustafa’ (Rule of the Prophet) as the objective of their struggle. Simultaneously, all cinema houses, beauty salons, wine shops, bars, video centres, use of cosmetics, listening to music or any such form of entertainment were banned by militant groups. There were bans imposed on the selling of cigarettes and on the circulation of Indian national- and Jammu based newspapers in the Kashmir Valley. Islamist groups threatened to bomb houses, where women refused to wear veils. Such diktats bear a striking similarity to the ones imposed by the Taliban in Afghanistan and recently by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria.

Various Islamist groups like Jamaat-e-Islami and its militant wing, HM, the radical women’s wing, Dukhtaran-e-Millat, Jamiat ul-Mujahideen, Allah Tigers, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, Al-Badr, Al Jihad Force, al Umar Mujahideen, Muslim Mujahideen, Islamic Students League, Zia Tigers, and many such organizations decreed the objective of their struggle as Islamization of the socio-political and economic set-up, merger of Jammu & Kashmir with Pakistan and establishment of an Islamic Caliphate.

The entry of Mark Tully into the valley, the former New Delhi Bureau Chief of the BBC, who urged people to shun Islamist extremism was banned by terrorist group Wahdat-e-Islamia. The offices of daily local newspapers like AftabAl-Safa and Srinagar Times were attacked with bombs and set on fire and several prominent media personalities including Mohammed Shaban Vakil, Editor of Al-Safa, Lassa Kaul, Station Director of Doordarshan-Srinagar were gunned down for not hauling the militant line. In a bid to destroy the established political structures and to foil the process of restoration of democracy in the State, a series of assassinations and bomb attacks on social and political activists belonging to nationalist and liberal sections of the Muslim society in Kashmir were also carried out. The Amir (Chief) of terrorist group LeT, Hafiz Mohammad Khan went on record saying: “Democracy is among the menaces we inherited… These are all useless practices and part of the system we are fighting against. If God gives us a chance, we will try to bring in the pure concept of an Islamic Caliphate”.

The liquidation of central government officials, Kashmiri Pandits, liberal and nationalist intellectuals, social and cultural activists was described as one of the prerequisites to cleanse the Valley of its un-Islamic elements thereby establishing an Islamic Order. The militant groups imposed the Islamist viewpoint on society, politics, governance and laws, and declared practices of democracy and secularism as unethical.

The initial call to jihad in Kashmir was rather generic, with a segment of population viewing the struggle as a means to ‘liberate’ the entire State from India, and in some cases also Pakistan, but soon the use of highly indoctrinated and Wahabised (Wahabism: form of Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of the Quran) proxies inducted into Kashmir became the norm. Many proclaim that these groups represent a far right political version of the Sunni Islamic faith that has been nurtured widely in South Asia since the Zia ul-Haq regime in Pakistan.

“Many of the Jihadi militants active in Kashmir (especially those with the closest reported links to Al-Qaeda) trace their religious origins to a conservative Islamic revivalist movement that began during the colonial period in India”, excerpt from Asian Economic & Political Issues, Authored by Frank Columbus.

The violence in the Kashmir Valley is now more religious in character than political, being dominated by a group of militant leaders acting under a Pan-Islamic ideology. Islamist intellectuals and activists have been seeking to distort the difference between Islam as a religion and nationalism, reinforcing the Islamic political consciousness by politicizing already existing religious traditions and practices and by resisting change and modernization. The young Islamic militants of today carry placards of Osama Bin Laden, hoist Taliban and ISIS flags while participating in anti-government rallies. They identify with the Sharia law and choose to remain alien to the concepts of democracy and modernization. The earlier ‘Azaadi’ (Freedom) slogan for autonomy and dignity has currently transformed into the expression of revulsion and rage against Hindu India and anything else non-Muslim.

Elections in Jammu & Kashmir (1998, 2002 & 2008)

The State Assembly elections, though boycotted by separatist groups were held in Jammu & Kashmir in 1996, in which the National Conference won and Farooq Abdullah was appointed as the Chief Minister of the State. The situation during this period was relatively peaceful as the level of violence was low till the time 23 Kashmiri Pandits were killed by terrorists in Wandhama town on 26 January 1998 (Republic Day of India). The incident, also referred to as ‘1998 Wandhama Massacre’, being carried out on the eve of a national celebration in the constituency of Farooq Abdullah, was a reminder of the evil designs by fanatic Islamic terrorists supported by Pakistan. The incident also indicated how the State and central government had failed to control the ‘Kashmir situation’, dejecting their claims of normalcy returning to the Valley.

Despite the threat of terrorism and politics of separatism, the electoral process continued and Assembly elections were conducted in 2002 and 2008, latter being the most successful one having witnessed increased participation indicating the decline in aspirations for ‘Azaadi’. However, on 26 May 2008, the Valley once again echoed with the slogans of ‘Azaadi’, because of the State government’s decision to transfer 99 acres (0.15 sq miles) of forest land in Kashmir Valley to the Hindu Amarnath Shrine to set up temporary shelters and facilities for Hindu pilgrims. The decision once again agitated the Muslim majority disrupting the peace process and many demonstrations, with protesters waving green flags opposing the State government’s decision of land transfer, were carried out by Kashmiri Muslims, thereby making it hard to ignore the deep Islamic impact. The State government accepted the demands of the protesters from the Kashmir Valley by revoking the land transfer decision on 1 July 2008, leading to disturbances in the Jammu province. Subsequently, several Hindu groups, such as the Bajrang Dal and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), started protesting in Delhi in support of the land transfer. The Amarnath land controversy resulted in widening the already existing gap between the people of Jammu & Kashmir, (while Ladakh remained aloof), based on religious identities.

The deluded youth of the Kashmir Valley

The unfortunate accidental death of a Kashmiri schoolboy, Tufail Mattoo, due to teargas shelling on 11 June 2010, was the ostensible flashpoint setting the Valley afire as mass protests erupted all over. The boy who was trying to make way home from school was immediately turned into an “accidental martyr” and was buried in the Martyr’s graveyard against the wishes of his family who wished their son to be buried in a family graveyard point. The killing of the boy was followed by protests, demonstrations and clashes with local and Central Armed Police Forces, in which another boy was killed leading to yet other protests till several young lives were lost. The official figures reveal around 110 people lost their lives and 537 civilians were injured during stone-pelting incidents from May to September 2010.

Following these incidents, the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), an amalgam of Pro-Pakistani separatist- and socio-political organizations, led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, once again called for the complete demilitarization of Indian Administered Jammu & Kashmir. The protestors continued shouting pro-Islamic slogans, targeting symbols of government authority, burning vehicles and attacking police with stones. Continuous shutdowns and strikes were called by separatist leaders periodically, leading to disastrous paralysis of peace and stability in the Kashmir Valley. Kashmiri youth was being incited by pro-Pakistan elements owing to their perceived hold on the youth to indulge in violence. The youth continued to be misinformed with biased and half-baked news on law and order developments in the Kashmir Valley while ironically, the children of these separatist leaders were conveniently out of this so-called movement, either studying in big cities or earning decent remunerations in different parts of the world, using the children of common man as foot soldiers to carry out their selfish designs.

The youth forms 65% of the population, addled between politics and religion. A report from trusted sources indicates that “61% of the Valley’s youth listens to religious sermons on their audio players” and “25% is interested in Jihadi speeches”. As a corollary, of these, 52% have qualified the higher secondary or undergraduate examination and 32% are graduates or postgraduates. It is indicated that a large number from this segment also has access to information from sermons and meetings at mosques, graveyards and television channels. The provocation is so impactful that some of the youth were found joining the militant organizations after leaving their luxurious jobs and academic institutions. While it may be contended that religious influence is not necessarily a negative sign, its possible implications could have disturbing heralds for the future. The youth are made to believe that the Muslims of the outside world are fighting for Kashmir’s independence and dying for Islam, further substantiated by the fact that the Hurriyat hardliner Syed Ali Shah Geelani held funeral prayers in absentia for the slain terrorist Osama bin Laden, who had no connection with Kashmir politics whatsoever, referring to it as a ‘religious duty’ of Kashmiri Muslims to hold prayers for the ‘Martyr’. The young and unemployed boys, having grown up in an atmosphere of continuous fear and unrest, silently develop respect for the Islamist militants in the Valley, who they think are dying for a divine cause. The education system in the Valley has suffered an irreparable loss, lacking the efficacy to help students develop a vision, who eventually take the recourse of Islam as an escape. The three decade long armed conflict and geo-political disorder has particularly affected the psychology of the Kashmiri youth which take to stone pelting conveying volumes about their vulnerabilities and psycho-social thought processes. Stone-pelting is legitimized as a vent for the young self-styled fighters to reflect their spirit of freedom and anger. The communication technology is being exploited; with young Kashmiri militants blatantly releasing their pictures and videos on social media, presenting themselves in the typical image of a virile ‘warrior’ – dressed in fatigues, carrying weapons, laughing or smiling in a forest background in an ‘ISIS-like’ fashion, glamourizing militancy and thereby trying to attract more youth.

The most extreme and appalling expression of this ‘cyber trend’ was seen following the death of Burhan Muzaffar Wani, a 22-year-old militant commander of the HM, on 8 July 2016. His death was followed by the usual large-scale protests, which advanced to a greater degree from this new-found ability of protestors to send and receive information on platforms beyond the control of the establishment that they were protesting against. The social media offered these young radicals a platform allowing unimpeded circulation of videos, pictures and information which further fuelled the unrest. As per informed sources about 300 WhatsApp groups were used to mobilize stone-throwers to disrupt security operations in Kashmir and each of these 300 groups had around 250 members. Prior to this, the quantity of people throwing stones was nowhere near this figure.

In a recent video released by Zakir Musa, a former HM commander, he professed his support to militant outfit Al Qaeda which supports Shariah: warning that people would be beheaded for referring to the Kashmir-issue as ‘political’and not an Islamic struggle.

Sharia law, which legalizes the use of force (armed jihad) as a means for establishing a Caliphate, also deprecates the concept of democracy (equality for all) because as per Wahhabi ideology there cannot be equality between a man and a woman, a believer and non-believer (kafir), master and a slave, a ruler and subject.

“Kashmir will become a Darul Islam (an abode of Islam). Insha’Allah (God willing), I am always opposing those who want to accede with the infidels.”, Zakir Musa, former HM commander.

Zakir Musa, in his early 20s, is said to be hailing from a highly-educated family and most of his siblings are reportedly doctors or pursuing medical degrees. He was deeply influenced by the jihadi preaching and literature and joined HM after dropping out from a Civil Engineering college. He ordained the Kashmiri youth to disdain the concepts of democracy and nationalism and turn towards Islam while openly inciting youth to throw stones at security forces; not in the name of nationalism but in the name of Islam.

This Islamic centric, reinvention of Kashmir-issue, has further divided the Kashmiri Muslims. On one hand youngsters are gravitating towards Zakir Musa’s argument of Kashmir-issue being a struggle for a divine cause and on the other hand there is another segment of the Kashmiri Muslim population who may have political grievances but support democracy and disdain Islamic order.

Conclusion

The concept of distinct Kashmiri political identity evolved in the 1930s with the rise of a movement against the Dogra rule in 1931. The young Kashmiri Muslim literati of the Kashmir Valley organized themselves as a political group which led to the formation of ‘All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference’ in 1932, with Sheikh Abdullah as its first President. The party aimed at addressing the popular anger and discontent amongst the Muslim majority against the feudal-cum-colonial Dogra rule, subsequently representing the demands and aspirations of the masses, particularly those of the Muslim majority. Sheikh Abdullah, elevated to the status of Sher-e-Kashmir (Lion of Kashmir), enlarged the scope of his party by reconstituting it to ‘National Conference’ emphasizing on its secular character, thus helping the party gain wider public support. When Pakistan invaded the State of Jammu & Kashmir in the year 1947, the Maharaja requested India’s military intervention and the Instrument of Accession was signed, giving India legitimate authority to take control of the State. Though both, the Maharaja and Abdullah accepted the accession, Sheikh’s goal was autonomy. He maintained an anti-Pakistan stand, being aware of Jinnah’s popularity as a Muslim leader in Pakistan, which was averse to his personal interest of ruling the State independently. Jinnah and Abdullah publicly criticized each other and Abdullah with his repeated commitment to secularism won support of the Kashmiri people.

“If Pakistan comes forward and says, we question the legality of Accession, I am prepared to discuss… We shall prove before the Security Council that Kashmir and the people of Kashmir have lawfully and constitutionally acceded to the Dominion of India, and Pakistan has no right to question that Accession”, Sheikh Abdullah in United Nations Security Council, 5 February 1948

The course of political development in the State of Jammu & Kashmir was relatively stable and remained free from communal and violent leanings till 1947, when Sheikh Abdullah started to fight for autonomy and Jammu based Praja Parishad, completely against it, began supporting merger with India.

India and Pakistan fought two more wars after 1947-1948, in 1965 and 1971 respectively. The 1971 war changed the geopolitical landscape of South Asia and Abdullah once again changed his political course and instead of talking about accession, began speaking about the quantum of autonomy.

The political legacy of the Sheikh Abdullah clan was carried forward by Sheikh Abdullah’s son Farooq Abdullah who won a convincing victory against the Congress in 1983. Farooq Abdullah was dismissed and replaced by Gul Mohammad Shah whose tenure lasted for two years from 1984-86. In 1986, Farooq Abdullah concluded an accord with Rajiv Gandhi and returned to power the following year. These elections were allegedly rigged, as everyone expected MUF to win, and have been deemed by some as being responsible for the insurgency in the Kashmir Valley. Ever since the Accession, the Sheikh dynasty, has ruled the State for more than 30 years and as and when, they are out of power in political commotion, they raise the slogan of ‘plebiscite’‘Azaadi’ and ‘autonomy’ which they intermittently use as a political trump card to exploit public sentiments. Some might say that it would not be unfair to state that mishandling of the State of Jammu & Kashmir by the government and inconsistent political stand of their own elected leaders left the people of the State, particularly that of the Kashmir Valley, ‘politically confused’.

Although the genesis of terrorism is often attributed to the alleged rigged elections, in reality it was the realization phase of Pakistan’s Operation Topac to inflict a thousand cuts on its adversary, India. Pakistan has always refuted the truth of Operation Topac but it has proved to be a reality both documentarily and circumstantially. The founder of JKLF, Amanullah Khan and Dr. Farooq Haider, Vice-Chairman of JKLF, have explicitly spoken to the press at several occasions conforming the legitimacy of Operation Topac and the fact that they were running Pakistan funded weapon training camps in Pakistan Administered Jammu & Kashmir. Pakistan has been successful in its design of stoking the fires of massive insurrection in the Kashmir Valley in early 1990. JKLF, funded by Pakistan organized a struggle of so-called self-determination, eventually resulting in violent abductions, senseless killing and other criminal activities. Though JKLF, that chose to be the face of insurgency claimed that insurgent movement was for freedom of the State, it never tried to liberate the part of the State (Gilgit Baltistan and Pakistan Administered Jammu & Kashmir) which is under the illegal occupation Pakistan. Instead, it used Pakistani funds to establish weapon training centres in Pakistan Administered Jammu & Kashmir for young boys from the Kashmir Valley to get trained, fight their own people back home and eventually get killed. They demanded the right of self-determination in the name of the people of Jammu & Kashmir but, in essence, campaigned on behalf Pakistan.

Pakistan withdrew its support from JKLF giving way to another terrorist organization, Hizbul Mujahideen, that favoured the idea of the State’s merger with Pakistan and establishment of an Islamic order while introducing the concept of jihad. The next decade was characterized by not only widespread violence throughout the Kashmir Valley but also structural changes of the Kashmiri society with an emphasis on the establishment of Islamic order. There was a mushroom growth of militant organizations that decreed the objective of their struggle as “Islamization”. Mosques became platforms for religious sermons intermingled with fiery political speeches, delivered by trained Islamic scholars (Mullahs) from Pakistan. Central government officials, Kashmiri Pandits, liberal and nationalist intellectuals, social and cultural activists, liberal Muslims and writers became the primary target of the gun-toting self-styled revolutionaries. Pakistan embarked on a strategy to convert the multi-lingual and multi-cultural Kashmiri society into a hardcore Islamic society, on the lines of Afghanistan, through the fear of the gun. Consequent to these developments, almost an entire population of minority community of Kashmiri Pandits was forced to run away from their ancestral land and continues to live in exile today.

Considering the array of events, it is hard to phantom that the struggle was in any way related to demands for greater political rights. Pakistan took advantage of a weak political system and palpable political divide among the people of State by imposing social changes associated with religion giving rise to Islamic fundamentalism and subsequently creating an environment from which insurgency thrived.

The Islamic Militants are the new role models for the unemployed youth who are made to believe that Muslims across the world are fighting and dying for them as a service to Islam. The disappearances of (now killed) Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar have been turned into myths and replaced by stories that Allah helped them to disappear and these stories are used by Islamic clerics in Kashmir while preaching to the youth in mosques. The education system has been destabilized, with the mushrooming growth of madrassas outpacing the modern institutions of education.

Jihad is not only fought with arms and weapons but also has a cyber dimension to it. Social media has glamourized militancy and an ideological war is being fought in this new operational theatre, using web based applications that allow creation and sharing of messages. ‘Electronic Jihad’includes activities such as the provocation to engage in terrorist activities and carry out violent attacks, radicalization and recruitment of supporters and carrying out a psychosomatic war aimed at increasing the enemy’s vulnerability.

Despite the bloodshed and ongoing unrest for nearly three decades, for a sizeable population, religion remains a key instrument in furthering the political agenda and seeking greater political rights. It is for these people to understand that practices that led to tampering of social order, pluralism and inter-religious harmony can never be divine. It needs to be acknowledged and accepted that no movement has succeeded in achieving its objectives unless it is inclusive in its political character and social base, representing political interests of all ethnic groups.

It is high time that media, civil society and most importantly, the political leaders who have been acting as the corporal hosts of the State, educate the youth of the Valley and discourage them to hero-worship militants, who majority of the times, are angry victims of pseudo-religious eyewash and economic deprivation.

The Exodus Of Kashmiri Pandits Explained.

Kashmiri Pandit woman sitting outside her refugee tent in Jammu

September 14, 1989 was a sunny day when Pandit Tika Lal Taploo, President of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Kashmir Chapter and a lawyer by profession, came out of his home in Bhan Mohalla locality of Srinagar and headed to the High Court where he practised law. As he stepped out, he saw a small girl crying. On recognizing that the child was of his Muslim neighbour, he lifted her in his arms, turned round and went straight to his neighbour to ask why the child was crying. The mother of the child said that her daughter needed some items of writing material but she had no money to buy these. Tika Lal took out a five rupee note from his pocket and handed it over to the woman. To the child he said, “My child, school is the place for you”.  

Tika Lal left them and turned to go to his work place. He had hardly walked 70 steps when three persons with faces wrapped in dark cloth appeared at the blind turn of the lane. Two of them kept standing while the third moved a few steps forward and came in line with Tika Lal. He took out a weapon, aimed at Tika Lal and said, “You are the BJP leader! Come then”. He pulled the trigger and bullets pierced the chest of Tika Lal, who fell down dead in a pool of blood. The Bar fraternity, mostly Muslims, organized a condolence meeting in the premises of the High Court and at Tika Lal’s residence, the one who cried and sobbed the loudest among a large number of mourners, was the mother of the child, Tika Lal had lifted in his arms just moments ago.

Barely three weeks after this murder in Srinagar, unknown gunmen shot and killed another Kashmiri Pandit (Kashmiri Hindu), retired Judge Nilakanth Ganjoo in broad day light in Maharaj Bazaar, Amira Kadal. He had flown in from New Delhi and was headed homewards. Obviously, someone was keeping track of him while in close contact with the gunmen. Justice Ganjoo, Sessions Judge in Srinagar had given a death sentence to Maqbool Bhat, the leader of Jammu & Kashmir National Liberation Front, whom he had found involved in the murder of Amar Chand, a CID Police Sub-Inspector of Jammu and Kashmir Police, resident of Nadihal village of Baramulla district.  These two killings of Tika Lal and Nilakanth Ganjoo sent a shock wave down the spine of the Pandit minority community of the Kashmir Valley. 

Gunning down of two outstanding members of their community in the autumn of 1989 within a span of only three weeks was ominous for the Pandits. It made them skeptic towards the law and order situation in the State and they started to feel deeply concerned about security of life. What baffled them more was that two Muslim witnesses on whose deposition Judge Ganjoo had based the judgement roamed as freemen. That evening, Radio Kashmir announced the incident in just one sentence; “Unknown assailants gunned down a former Sessions Judge in Maharaj Bazaar, Srinagar”. Fear-stricken Pandits, with anguish written large on their face, huddled up in their homes to think over the seriousness of the threats to which they were exposed. Was death looming large over their heads? Their apprehensions were not unfounded.

Elections and Muslim United Front (MUF) 

Two months before  the killing of BJP leader Tika Lal Taploo, Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister  Farooq  Abdullah had ordered the release of a number of Kashmiri Muslim youth from Srinagar jails, who were alleged to have crossed the Line of Control (LoC) and received training in terrorist camps in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir. They were the early activists of Muslim United Front (MUF), a newly formed political group that contested 1987 elections to the Legislative Assembly  of Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir and were charged with sedition against the State. MUF had strongly protested against alleged rigging of elections by National Conference-Congress combine, which later on formed the coalition government with Farooq Abdullah in the driver’s seat. MUF claimed that National Conference musclemen had let loose reins of terror during the elections. Their polling agents were assaulted, manhandled, abused and humiliated. Bringing National Conference’s oppressive measures and acts of intimidation to the notice of the Election Commission evoked no reaction from the latter. It convinced MUF that the entire election machinery was functioning in a partisan manner. Although they had their reasons to lose trust in the fairness of the Election Commission, the Kashmiri Pandits had no role in these political rivalries. A community with barely 3 per cent population had no say in anything, yet the community was to be made a scapegoat in this political tug of war.

MUF, the frontline activists of Kashmir’s Jamaat-e-Islami, projected the rigging episode as a step towards suppression of Muslim predominance in the State. Armed resistance was the option and there were takers of the option in the Valley of Kashmir as well as in Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir. The idea of Islamic resistance movement highly suited late Zia-ul Haq’s (Military Dictator of Pakistan) ‘Operation Topac’ plan for Jammu and Kashmir, and Pakistan’s super intelligence organization, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) came into action.

Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)

ISI planned roping in of political activists in Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir and their UK-based strong diaspora. The Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), altogether with its twin centers in Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir and UK, initiated armed insurgency in the Kashmir Valley in the mid-1980s with outright support of ISI.  It opened its account of killing Hindus with the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Indian Assistant Commissioner Ravindra Mhatre in Birmingham in 1984. Amanullah Khan, originally from Astore in Gilgit Baltistan (Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir) but settled in Luton, UK, faithfully carried out ISI’s instructions to his gangsters and coordinated an armed insurgency in the Kashmir Valley. JKLF secretly raised its cadres in the Valley and claimed the killings of Pandits beginning with the murder of Tika Lal Taploo.

Acting under the instructions of ISI, JKLF adopted a two-pronged strategy for activism in the Kashmir Valley. These were (i) Kalashnikov and (ii) a massive disinformation campaign. JKLF commanders drew power from Kalashnikovs that flowed to them from Pakistani arsenals through their handlers in training camps in Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistani intelligence agencies laid much emphasis on launching a massive disinformation campaign across the world saying that there was an indigenous freedom movement in the Kashmir Valley against ‘Indian occupation’ and that Pakistan was only extending moral and diplomatic support to it. Using JKLF as its hand tool, ISI made deep inroads into the large diaspora of Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir in UK and in the Kashmir Valley. Many youth in Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir and the Valley were enrolled as activists and contributors to the political formation of JKLF. ISI opened numerous terrorist training camps close to the Line of Control (LoC) where retired Pakistan army officers were employed as trainers for the youth from the Kashmir Valley. They received short and long term training in fighting tactics, after completion of which they were given arms and ammunition and asked to return/infiltrate into the Indian administered part of Jammu and Kashmir for undertaking terrorist and subversive activities.

Realizing that the diaspora of Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir could play a crucial role in fomenting armed insurgency in the valley, Pakistani intelligence agencies also adopted a two pronged strategy. First the people in Pakistan and Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir had to be indoctrinated with the concept of Islamic Jihad in which the Hindu as kafir (infidel) becomes the target. Hating Hindus became the refrain of this massive propaganda. The people were told that Muslims were suppressed and oppressed by the Hindus in Kashmir. The second part of the strategy was to whet the lust of the activists in Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir for domination over the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir, if the Valley was cleansed of its Hindu population, no matter howsoever tiny and insignificant. They were told that once the Kashmir Valley was cleared of impure Indian and Hindu presence, they would be the masters of that part and enjoy the prosperity to their heart’s content as Kashmiris would be nothing more than the hewers of wood and drawers of water for them.

ISI’s Plan

A number of Kashmiri youth whose release order from the jail was issued by the then Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah were among the first batch of Kashmiri youth who had crossed over and landed in the terrorist training camps in Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir. While returning to Kashmir they had been arrested by the Border Security Forces and handed over to the local Police which registered cases against them. The top four among them, namely Hamid Sheikh, Ashfaq Wani, Javed Mir and Yasin Malik were the pioneers of the armed insurgency in the Valley, with the assignment to begin with decimation of the Pandit community. The killings of the two prominent leaders referred to at the opening of this Study-paper, has to be seen in this background.

Killings of more Kashmiri Pandits followed soon after. Panun Kashmir, the frontline organization of internally displaced Pandits in Jammu, submitted to the Indian National Human Rights Commission a detailed list of 1341 Pandit killings in the Valley or other parts of the State like Kishtwar and Reasi by armed insurgents belonging to JKLF and other Jihadi groups who were rivaling with each other in perpetrating atrocities on Pandits. This number includes those who disappeared or were fished out from rivers and were never recorded in police records.

It was widely rumored that clandestine crossing of the Line of Control by Kashmiri youth for receiving training and arms in training camps in Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir was facilitated by bribing the Indian Border Security Forces. The slogan “to Sopore, Kupwara (Cities close to the LoC) and the other side” was on the lips of adventurous Kashmiri youth at that time. The disinformation strategy had two components; Feeding international as well as vulnerable sections of the Indian press, both print and electronic, with false and fabricated stories, lies and canard of Indian army’s ‘oppression and suppression of Kashmir’s nationalist uprising’. The second was the indoctrination of Kashmiri Muslim youth lured to the terrorist training camps in different places in Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir with hate-Hindu and hate-India propaganda. The second part of this strategy spelt disaster for the Kashmiri Pandit community when these indoctrinated and trained gunmen returned to the Kashmir Valley adequately equipped with arms and indoctrinated with rabid fundamentalist ideology.

Perhaps, it is just possible that in the training camps, these JKLF gunmen were not strictly told to unleash terror against the Kashmiri Pandit community as a whole. But a young Muslim indoctrinated with fundamentalist ideology and with a deadly automatic weapon called in his hands wanted a target – Maligned Kashmiri Pandit was the sitting duck. Amanullah Khan, the chief of JKLF had confessed the same to a Pandit rights activist in a seminar in the European Parliament in Brussels in 1992. When the rights activist told him that his so-called freedom fighters had let loose brutal killing, rape, kidnapping, intimidating, issuing warnings through loudspeakers to run away from the Kashmir Valley to the Pandits, how could that be called a ‘freedom movement’. Amanullah Khan replied that was not the agenda but ‘the boys back to Kashmir with weapons became uncontrollable. They attacked Pandits because the Pandits did not join the armed struggle’.

After the National Conference-Congress coalition government resigned under the pressure of the militants, armed youth almost ruled the lawless Valley of Kashmir. Farooq Abdullah went to London to play golf and his dismissed colleagues in the Council of Ministers hid their heads in Jammu where they illegally occupied government bungalows and some of them entered into secret liaisons with the Kashmiri insurgency leadership.

Change of plans

Alarmed at the success of JKLF cadres in dislodging the elected government in Srinagar (Summer Capital of Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir), and noticing the rising crescendo of anti-India sentiment among the Kashmiri people in the Kashmir Valley, ISI changed the goal post and came out in its true colors. ISI found it unavoidable to send a message of ‘thus far and no further’ to the JKLF. ISI sponsored a parallel terrorist group, named Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM). Rivalry between the two ideologically divergent groups resulted in the killing of many JKLF leaders and activists in the Valley. Nevertheless, Hizbul Mujahideen carried forward the policy of Pandit massacres initiated by the JKLF. In response, Amanullah Khan gave a call for a ‘Great March’ into Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir by mass violation of the ceasefire line at the border town of Uri. Panicked by the consequences of violating the Line of Control by the JKLF leadership, and totally opposed to JKLF’s proclaimed ideology of an United Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistani troops opened fire on the obstinate marchers killing at least 17 of them and wounding many more. This was 1992, the second year of insurgency in Kashmir.

Thereafter ISI’s strategy of Kashmir insurgency changed. It sidelined JKLF charging its proclaimed ideology of an Independent, United Jammu and Kashmir as diametrically opposite to Pakistan’s claims to the entire State. ISI raised new armed groups in the Kashmir Valley, dozens of them under different names to play the central role. Most of them were affiliated to numerous fundamentalist-terrorist organizations based in Pakistan receiving all round support like arms, ammunition, money, logistics, equipment and direction from ISI’s Kashmir chapter. In due course of time, all these armed groups were sucked up by Pakistan’s two major terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad.

Days after the killing of Tikalal Taploo on September 14, 1989, a Kashmiri Pandit published a letter in Kashmir Times asking insurgency leadership to publicly spell out their policy towards Kashmiri Pandits in the light of the murder of a Pandit political leader. The response in next day’s issue said, that the Pandits should join the armed movement for the liberation of Kashmir from the ‘occupation of India’ failing which they should be prepared for any fate.

In private and in public, in homes and in mosques, Kashmir Valley’s Muslim society was in revolt. In their mass congregations, India was painted as the occupier and the Kashmiri Pandits were dubbed as the spies of India. The tag that Pandits are the spies of India in Kashmir never left them. After the 4th of November, 1989, the day Judge Ganjoo was gunned down, the scenario envisaged by Zia’s ‘Operation Topac’ began to unfold layer after layer. Firing here and a blast there foretold of coming events. Muslim clergy intensified their hate Hindu tirade in public and private assemblies and in Friday congregations, they poured venom in their sermons and projected Kashmiri Brahmans – this bare 3 per cent religious minority –  a source of threat to the 97 per cent Muslim majority in the perceived Islamic theocratic State. Outright denigration of India, Indian democracy, Indian army and establishment were meant to unnerve the Pandits.

The Exodus

It was 19th of January, 1990 and days were cold and nights bitter, though there was no snow on the ground.  Around 9 PM, loud and thunderous Islamic and pro-Pakistan slogans raised collectively by a multitude of humanity and relayed through powerful loudspeakers almost pierced ear drums. These slogans were not new to Pandits in the Valley of Kashmir as they were familiar to such outbursts, however the very odd hour, the tumultuous bang and the intriguing spontaneity besides the pressing loudspeakers into service, all spoke threateningly that a storm was brewing in the Kashmir Valley.

Suddenly, telephone bells began ringing loudly in the houses of most of the Pandits in Srinagar. Mobile phones had not been introduced then. Each caller on the other end of the line asked his relative, friend or acquaintance whether they were safe. This question carried more meaning underneath its simple words. The callers told their respondents to come out of their houses in that dark and dreary night and see for themselves what a strange scenario was unfolding on the streets and squares of the city of Srinagar. Scenes on the streets, squares and open spaces in the city were to be seen to be believed. Masses of Muslim population, young, old, children, and women came out of their homes, crowded the streets, gesticulating vigorously and yelling slogans in favor of Islam, Pakistan and the insurgency. Crowds of people carried rugs, carpets, mats and furnishing and spread it out on the streets and squares. They brought wood and lit bonfires to keep their bodies warm. People sat, squatted, danced, shook fists made violent gestures as loud speakers were fixed and microphones blurred a mix of Quranic verses, revolutionary songs, anti-India vitriolic and the supremacy of Islamic faith, all by turn making rounds from one to another speaker, each speaker more rabid fire brand than his predecessor. Islamic slogans, profuse admiration for Pakistan, stories of the heroes of early Islamic conquests, the paradise created by Allah for the Momin (pure) and hell fire for the kuffar (unbelievers) etc. were the major themes of their outpouring. Speakers praised Islam as the best religion God had sent through the Prophet. The crux of these surcharged utterances was that all symptoms of kufr (heresy), butparast (idolatry) and dualism as with the Hindus had to be cleaned from daru’l salam (the place of peace). Spirited stories of the heroes of early Islam like Omar and great commanders like Sa’d bin Waqqas and Tariq and others were recounted conveying that Islam had not lost the strength of destroying non-believers. This rant continued till wee hours. The message went to the Pandits that they were in the line of fire.

Like frightened pigeons, the Pandits huddled up in their nests and kept vigil all night. Not a single soul came out of his house to go to the temple for prayers or to Hari Parbat heights to pay usual obeisance to the deity. The night-long tirade against non-Muslims on the one hand and lionizing of Islamic war lords on the other, snatched whatever remnant of peace of mind they were left with. The question that caused them grave distress was how they could live in the Valley of Kashmir without the goodwill of the majority community with which they have had centuries of good and brotherly relations. To Kashmiri Pandits his Muslim neighbor was neither an enemy nor a rival just because of their very insignificant rather negligible numbers. For the first time in the history of Jammu and Kashmir this open and unabashed tirade was let loose against them on such a massive scale. The administration collapsed and law and order were thrown to winds. The police deserted their posts and the Pandits were left to themselves with their survival hanging in balance.

The Pandits found that overnight their neighbors had changed color. Their idiom changed as if they had thrown off the mask they wore for such a long time. Pandit and Muslim neighbors known to one another for generations began to behave as strangers. Suspicions loomed large and in a few days the entire atmosphere changed and the Pandit came to be called ‘the other’. The government was knocked out by a single night of defiance and revolt and the next morning not a single policeman was visible anywhere in the city. They had withdrawn to their barracks or hid in their homes as the administrative machinery had collapsed and law and order crumbled. From the next morning viz. 20th of January, 1990 it was the rule of the mosque, the priest and the Islamists. Loud speakers fixed to mosque tops, blurred uninterruptedly cautioning the Pandits to leave the Valley. The refrain of their slogans was that they wanted their Kashmir without Pandit males but with their women folk. Traditional Kashmir Muslim society has always been respectful of Kashmiri Pandit womenfolk and this shameful and shocking slogan showed that only a fringe section of Kashmir Muslim society indoctrinated in hate mania was out to disrupt communal harmony.

However, the hate campaign, carried forward through barbaric and inhuman means of violence, struck fear among the entire Kashmiri population to the extent that nobody was prepared to show even the slightest goodwill to the Pandits. Al Safa, a popular Urdu daily of Srinagar minced no words in telling the Pandits to leave the Valley within hours if they wanted to save their lives and honor. Loud speakers fixed on mosque tops blurred a profusion of warnings of similar type. More and more anti-India demonstrations were to be seen on the streets in which demonstrators were mad with anger, hate and revenge. Fear stricken Pandits did not find any source that could assure them at least the safety of life. In its evening news bulletin, Radio Kashmir took the name of the Kashmiri Pandits gunned down by terrorists. The gruesome stories of murder of hapless Pandits unnerved the community members. There was no sense of approaching majority community for protection and help because the neighbors, too, were in the grip of fear heightened by the collapse of law and order. The dynamics of secret and selective militancy so rigidly drilled into the heads of the actors, had reached a level that the son who returned after training never disclosed to his parents and family members where he had been and on what mission. Indoctrination was of the level that even parents began to fear their sons. This is best explained in the television interview which Bitta Karate gave to the security officials after he was arrested and interrogated by security agencies.

Bitta Karate was one of the top JKLF gun wielders who had crossed over to Pakistan Administered Jammu and Kashmir in 1989, and received training and indoctrination in the camps there. In the interview, the journalist asks him on whose behest did he carry out the killing of the Pandits. He replied that he obeyed the orders of his senior Ashfaq Wani and Amanullah Khan. When asked if his senior told him to kill his parents would he do that as well,  he emphatically said, “Yes”. This speaks of the type of barbarianism that was sucking the Valley into its vortex. Asked how many Kashmiri Pandits he had gunned down, Bitta replied, “I lost the count after killing 22 of them”. When asked who was the first victim of his bullets he took the name of one Satish Kumar Tiku, who was a friend (and perhaps also a class fellow) of Bitta Karate, and occasionally visited him in his Srinagar home. Bitta Karate had returned after undergoing training in terrorist camps and Satish, not knowing where his friend Bitta had disappeared for a while, went to see him in his home. He found Bitta cleaning a gun (AK 47). Surprised on seeing the weapon Satish asked him what it was. Bitta avoided the question and said that it was a toy he played with. Naïve as Satish was, he took it lightly and soon forgot the incident and left his friend. But Bitta was greatly disturbed and went to see the ‘commander’, related to him the story and asked for directions. The commander told him to finish Satish lest he discloses it to police. Bitta went to Satish’s house and called him to come out of his home. No sooner did Satish step out on the street, Bitta, in a flash of a moment, aimed his China made pistol at him and fired shots that pierced through Satish’s heart. He fell down dead in a pool of blood. Brandishing his pistol in the air in broad day light, Bitta scared the pedestrians and walked away in complete confidence. Today the killer of 22+ Pandits is roaming a freeman in Srinagar city.

Yasin Malik, a terror comrade of Bitta was arrested in connection with the gunning down of six uniformed Indian Air Force personnel at Barzulla, Srinagar waiting at a bus stand. Yasin Malik riding the pillion of his friend’s bike opened fire at the standing airmen with an automatic weapon, killing all of them and the bike riders sped away. Yasin Malik, later on became the chief of JKLF in Indian Administered Jammu and Kashmir after the party split.

Ms. Girija Tickoo, a Kashmiri Pandit teacher in a government school in Kupwara district was coming out of the school building after collecting her salary when she was accosted by gunmen who kidnapped her to some unknown place where she was gang raped. The assailants, fearing she might disclose their identity, forcibly put her under a machine saw and cut her body into pieces. Avtar Krishan Koul, Deputy Director Food Supplies was gunned down by masked terrorists in his office. He had enquired into the disappearance of some truckloads of food grain supplies reportedly taken away by JKLF activists at gun point. Lassa Kaul, Director Doordarshan (Television) Srinagar was gunned down outside his house in Bhan Mohalla. He was accused of relaying anti-militancy news. Pandit Premnath Bhat of Anantnag was a lawyer by profession and a very popular social figure much liked by people of all communities. Masked Jihadis barged into his house, dragged him out and emptied on him their magazines of their guns. Professor Nilakanth Raina (Lala) of Jammu and Kashmir Government Higher Education Department, an eminent historian and researcher was called by masked and armed gunmen at about dusk at his home in Fateh Kadal locality in Srinagar and gunned down at point blank range. Professor Nilakanth was conducting researches into the Buddhist antiquity of Jam’a Masjid mosque in Nowhatta, Srinagar. In November 1989, Sheela Tikoo was gunned down near Habba Kadal. On 4th of March, 1990, Mrs. M.N Paul, the wife of an Inspector of BSF was kidnapped, raped and then murdered because she happened to be the wife of a government official. Also in March 1990, B.K. Ganjoo, an engineer in Telecommunication Department was brutally gunned down while he tried to hide himself in an empty drum used for storing rice. The assailants climbed the third floor of his house to catch hold of him. His wife begged the murderers to kill her too but only to receive the sadist remark, “there should be someone left to cry over his dead body”. In April 1990, a nurse named Sarla Bhat was kidnapped and continuously raped for several days before her dead body was thrown on the roadside. In May 1990, Mrs. Prana Ganjoo and her husband Prof. K.L. Ganjoo were kidnapped in Sopore where the woman was raped and then both of them were murdered. In June 1990, Mrs. J.L. Ganjoo, her husband and her sister-in-law (husband’s sister) were killed in their home in Ban Mohalla, Srinagar. In July 1990, a working woman, namely Teja Dhar was shot dead on the roadside in Ali Kadal, Srinagar. In July 1990, a Pandit lady named Nanaji was gunned down on the roadside in Batamaloo, Srinagar. In July 1990, Dr. Shani was locked up in her house in Karan Nagar and then the house was set on fire. Flames consumed her alive. In August 1990, Babli Raina was raped in front of her family members in her house and then shot dead. One particular case which literally butchered the tradition of tolerance and communal harmony as well as the tradition of humanism in the Valley of Kashmir happened on 30th of April 1990, when four armed persons forced entry into the house of Sarwanand Koul Premi in Anantnag district. They dragged him out of his house along with Virender Koul, his 27-year old son for ‘enquiry’ and in the nearby jungle, the father and son both were gunned down. Sarwanand Koul, a poet and scholar, was 64 years of age and had translated the Bhagwat Gita into Kashmiri. A copy of the Quran was preserved in his house which he used to read occasionally.

It is not possible to give details of all Pandit killings in this Study paper. Panun Kashmir, a political organization of the displaced Pandits, has published a complete list of about 1341 Kashmiri Pandits who were killed by Jihadi armed men in the course of armed insurgency in the Valley of Kashmir in 1990 and after. This includes the disappeared and fished out Pandits, whose identity was not established and the police kept no record of them. Interestingly the J&K State government reduced the number of Pandits killed by militants below 200. According to critics, this distortion of numbers has been done deliberately to escape the censure by the UN, which according to Tokyo Convention has recognized killings beyond 200 as genocide. It must be noted that the National Commission for Human Rights of India while considering the appeal of the Kashmiri Pandits, said that they were subjected to killings ‘akin to genocide’.

Apart from individual killings, Kashmiri Pandits were also subjected to horrific massacres as Jihadi insurgency fanned all over the Kashmir Valley and its adjoining areas. Here is appended, a chart that gives some information about mass killings of the Kashmiri Pandits and (other) Hindus in post-exodus days.

As disorder and lawlessness gripped the Valley, the Pandits shivered with fear. This was the atmosphere of fear and lawlessness in which the Pandits became homeless. In these circumstances it was but natural that the entire Pandit community stood fear-stricken and then followed the impulse of running away from this cauldron. The entire community had lost the confidence in the majority community. 

Members of a high ranking delegation of parliamentarians visiting Srinagar to assess the ground situation quarrelled among themselves on seating arrangements in the meeting room.  They showed scant understanding and interest in the critical situation in the Valley and the sword of death dangling on the head of the vulnerable minority. The Pandits found that the Indian government, too, had written them off. Threatened and defenceless Pandits had no option but to leave their millennia old homeland, homes, hearths, properties, jobs, business, farms, orchards, temples, shrines, cremation grounds, Gods, deities, and the ashes of their forefathers. They engaged whatever means of transportation they could manage, took a bagful of clothing and headed out of the Valley to unknown and un-seen destinations. They left in trickles for fear of being captured en route and butchered in cold blood. The process continued for the first two-three months of 1990. Despite the fact that thousands of soldiers were garrisoned in Badami Bagh Cantonment, Srinagar, not one soldier escorted the fleeing fugitives. In spite of the silence of the Kashmiri Muslims on the atrocities committed against the Kashmiri Pandits, the general masses of Kashmiri Muslims did not obstruct the exit of the Kashmiri Pandits and facilitated their safe journey out of the Kashmir Valley.

The Pandits of Kashmir, who had braved numerous spells of forced conversions and destruction of their civilizational symbols during six centuries in the past, were extirpated from their five thousand year-old homeland at a time when India was governed by a Democratic and Secular dispensation. Seeing the current rise in Islamic fundamentalism and radicalization of the youth of the Valley of Kashmir, it can be concluded that the Kashmir Valley’s ethnic cleansing is complete and everlasting. They have been banished from their birth place not for decades or centuries or millennia, but for all times to come.

Aftermath

After their departure the houses of the Kashmiri Pandits remained abandoned in the Kashmir Valley. Miscreants looted household goods, furniture, kitchenware, accessories, electronic gadgets, small libraries, papers, files and documents. Electricity and sanitary fittings were pulled out, taken away and sold. In most cases even the doors and windows of these houses were removed and stolen. The bare structures were set on fire if these did not happen to be in densely populated areas. Large number of houses and properties went on distress sale. Shops were grabbed by the locals, though a handful of them fetched the owner some money. In villages, the ruins of torched Pandit’s houses were grabbed and showed as Muslim Endowment (Awqaf) property in revenue records. If any Pandit was able to sell his property somehow, he had to remain content with its throw-away price. Landed properties of Pandit shrines, temples and crematoriums stand largely vandalized and usurped. The ethnic cleansing of the Valley of Kashmir was completed.

Conclusion

The Kashmir Valley has become a theocratic Islamic place within the secular Indian Union. The people of the Kashmir Valley, with hundred per cent Muslim population (barring a few negligible minorities which account for less than 1%), are increasingly identifying themselves with the wider Sunni Muslim world. The Kashmir Valley does not have a viable economy and it depends on huge financial doles from New Delhi under one or the other pretext. However, the State Government is usually unwilling to render any account for these receipts which results in no accountability and leads to corruption. Many members of the political leadership of the Kashmir Valley, including the Kashmiri separatists are mostly ambivalent and their pro-Indian or pro-Pakistani credentials are subject to the quantum of funds provided.

The return of the Kashmiri Pandits to the Kashmir Valley depends on the goodwill of the majority community in the Valley. That is no more to be found nor is there wisdom enough within the leadership of the Kashmir Valley to understand how important it is to live in harmony with people of other faiths. The Kashmiri Pandits should understand that the fetters they wore for seven centuries are broken once and for all and their wings should take them over to new climes and lands.

Diasporas have, also, built great civilizations.

Afghan Sikh who calls India his home.

Indian govt has decided to facilitate the return of remaining Afghan Sikhs and this decision has been welcomed by all in the community. Afghan Sikhs who moved to india during the start of civil war in Afghanistan are happy to welcome their own as the first flight lands in Delhi today. (Sunday 26th July 2020).

An afghan sikh who moved to India in 1994 recounts his experience of leaving his motherland and tells me that the Sikhs moving in today feel more or less the same. The emotion of letting go of everything that one has known and the idea of starting a new life in a new country is not at all fancy but it is the pill they have to take if they have to survive he tells me.

I asked Sardar Iqbal Singh few questions over the phone in the wake of the changing things in Afghanistan & Afghan Sikhs coming to india after long spree of persecution & terror unleashed on them.

Iqbal singh owns a mobile accessory shop that is of the size of 2*3 ft. He pays 8000/- per month for that space which is a negotiated price brought down from 12,000/- “The landlord is a local Hindu, and he was very kind to bring down the price without much of negotiations. He doesn’t force me to pay him if I am late on the payment. I felt the same touch in Afghanistan with my own people, and now they are my own people.

Q-1. When did you move to india? Can you describe how it happened?

Answer- I moved to India in 1994 after the start of civil war in Afghanistan. The circumstances then were different and I think it was a wise decision. I got married in 1988 & by the time I moved Jaspreet (my daughter) was an year old. I did not want to suffer in any way. I still remember withdrawing all the cash I had and closing my bank accounts in Jallalabad. It was an emotional day.

Q-2 How was the life initially and how has it changed if it has at all?

Answer- Oh son! This is hard to answer. We took the bitter pill at that time and it had to have the consequences. We came & stayed in Gurdwara Singh Sabha in West Delhi. Some Sikhs were already living in other Gurdwaras. My daughter was scared to go out of room that she was in with her mother and two other women and children. I used to sleep outside for around an year & half after which we got a temporary accommodation with reference of someone in DSGMC. There was nothing happening on financial aspect for 2yrs. I used up all my savings on my child & wife to give them life they deserved. I remember walking to Chandni Chowk because rickshaw cost was too much to go buy a new dress for Jaspreet on Baisakhi. She still has the dress. After 2yrs one of my friend took a shop on lease in Karol Bagh and I worked on his shop. It took me 8yrs to own the khokha I have now

Q3 What do you think about the recent attacks on afghan sikhs?

I think the attacks are unfortunate & unjust. Be it the 2018 or 2020, minorities have always been under the scanner in Afghanistan. Afghan govt has always been weak in handling Taliban. It used to be a peaceful country until the start of civil war. As an afghani we always blamed US for all the problems but now I think the things are not as simple as that. ‘We clap with both the hands’

4. What do you think of Bill that india passed?

You know I steer clear of answering this one because during recent Delhi Anti CAA protests, our market in Karol Bagh was flooded with young boys and girls seeking our opinion on CAA and modifying statements for their reporting. We have also given a video statement thanking govt of india for enabling us to get the documents and passport. We can call ourselves Indian now and some people seem to have problem with that too. Turns out there is no home for poor.

Q-5 What are hardships that you face in india on everyday basis?

I live an average life of an Indian in a metro city who goes to work and comes back in the evening to his family so my hardships except for the first 8yrs are more or less same as any other person. Say Aggarwal Sahib who sells bags in Karol Bagh faces same problems that I do. We aren’t racially discriminated, nor are we looked down upon by anyone. Indian sikh community has deepest respect for Afghan Sikhs and they always meet us to ask about Sikhism in Afghanistan

Q-6 Do you ever want to go back to Afghanistan?

If the situation improves in Afghanistan and Taliban are wiped off the face of earth, we can think of resettling in Afghanistan again. But that is too much of whataboutery and a distant dream. We no longer live in fantasy land.

Q-7 What were some important problems that community faced in Afghanistan?

Oh a lot of them. There were illegal property captures, kidnappings, murders, rapes, threat letters and what not. Like I told you I moved at the time when all this was just starting and rest is history. Everyone knows what has become of Afghanistan

Q-8 Why did you choose india?

No other country at that time knew the plight that we would face. Some people did move to UK & Canada But it all depended on who financed their movement & all that. Economic strata on top moved to countries like UK & Canada using their contacts. For middle class people like me, India was home and will always be. I remember talking to 17 other families that moved with us. We all did an ardaas and felt happy that we would be able to take the holy dip in Sarovar of Guru Ramdas ji.

Q-9 What happened to your properties that you owned?

I owned a house & a shop with a bicycle. I gave the bicycle to my friend Gul Majeed because he walked to his shop everyday. I sold my property to my neighbor at a far lower price that it could have got. But majboori thi

Q-10 What do you say about common afghans?

Answer- Oh they are the sweetest people you will ever meet. When my daughter was born, my neighbors organised a feast and my neighbor’s wife named her Jaspreet after a journo with the same name she had met in Kabul. Local afghans had no hate for Sikhs. They understood our culture, used to come to Gurdwaras and we used to hike together to mountains. I remember spending my childhood collecting used cartridges on firing ranges with my afghan friends. It was all good until Taliban put venom in their head.

Q-11 What would you advise authorities about the new refugees coming in

I think Indian authorities are doing great and have also fast tracked the process to facilitate afghan sikhs. I hope authorities ensure that Sikhs don’t have to stay in Gurdwaras for very long time. Ensuring some sort of job would be good. Sikhs and other people should employ afghan boys as well. Financial aspect is the only thing that needs to taken care of.

Thank you so much for your time Iqbal Singh ji.

Thank you

Guru Nanak Dev Ji’s visit to Jagannath Temple & Story Of Sikh Aarti

The veteran actor Balraj Sahni, who taught in Santiniketan in the late 1930’s, once asked Rabindra Nath Tagore, “You have written the national anthem for India. Why not write an international anthem for the whole world?”

It has already been written, not only for the world but for the entire universe. It
was written in the 16th century by Guru Nanak,” replied Tagore. He was referring to the Sikh Arti (the ceremony of light). Gurudev Tagore was so enamoured of this Arti that he had personally translated it into Bengali.

Every evening, after the recitation of Rehraas Sahib, the melodious rendition of this Arti, sung by the Raagis in Raga Dhanashri, can be heard in Gurudwaras. Listening to the Arti is a tremendously soothing experience, capable of taking one directly into the spiritual realms of devotion through music. It has been aptly mentioned by Guru Arjan Devji in the Sri Guru Granth Sahibji: “Arti kirtan sada anand”, which translates as “Singing God’s praises is His Arti, and this brings boundless bliss”.
As legend has it, it was during Guru Nanak Devji’s visit to the Jagannath Temple at
Anil Dhir Puri in 1506 CE that this Arti was composed. The temple priests conducted an elaborate Arti every evening. They brought a big platter on which were many lighted lamps, and the accompanying paraphernalia of flowers, incense, ornaments, pearls etc. and began the Arti. This was accompanied with the beating of drums and cymbals, the ringing of the bells and chants from the scriptures. Guru Nanak was a saint of the Bhakti Cult and its exponents had the goal of uniting the human race through true devotion to God and emphasised the oneness of God. He, along with the other exponents of the Bhakti Cult like Ramananda, Kabir, Chaitanya, Namdev, Tukaram and Ramdas had all originally believed the formless worship of the Lord. But the symbolic image of Lord Jagannath was neither of any “Akar” nor was it “Nirakar”. The perplexed Nanak seeing this “Kimkar” (of which form?) image, was simply astonished and was overwhelmed with deep reverence. He understood the universalism of Jagannath and started the ‘Namakirtan’ of the Lord in his own way. Basically, Nanak believed in the formless worship of ‘Nirakar’- Brahma and his motto was ‘Ek Onkar Satnam’. It means that he believed in ‘Onkar ’ or ‘Pranava Brahma’ which has no form and stressed on the ‘Satnam’ or the true Namakirtan of the Lord.

While at the Jagannath Temple, Guru Nanak observed that the priests were attaching more importance to the rituals rather then to the true faith of the Lord. He noticed that most of the devotees were joining the ritual not with their hearts; at best they were enjoying the spectacle of it. But, after seeing Jagannath for the first time, and the elaborate Arti, Guru Nanak Dev Jicould not reject him on the ground that he was incompatible with his own Bhakti philosophy. All the gathered devotees stood up and gazed at the Lord with great devotion, like they do even today. But Nanak was so charged with ecstasy that he could not mark these reactions of the people. He was filled with great pleasure, was transfixed, and thus remained seated. So overwhelmed was he, that tears rolled down his eyes.
A section of the orthodox priests marked this indifference of Guru Sahib and took it as disrespect to Lord Jagannath. After the Arti was over, they confronted him and asked him why he had not stood up during the Arti. They cast aspirations on his being a holy man and said that mere rosaries and a monastic garb don’t make a monk. Guru Nanak Sahib stood there as a silent spectator, as if
nothing had happened. However the priests persisted that he explains his conduct and then Guru Sahib spoke:
“Dear brothers ! Does our Jagannath exist only here and in this wooden image? Is he not dazzling in the aura of his own greatness, inside all creation? Cannot his Mahima be felt and experienced without the accompanying rituals? “
Guru Nanak Dev ji had by that time understood the real potentialities of Lord Jagannath. He had seen the touch of universalism and Vedic symbolism manifest in the wonderful image of Lord Jagannath. While uttering these words, Guru Nanak Dev ji became highly emotional and looking at the Lord, he started to sing a few stanzas from a Sikh composition. He spontaneously composed a Maha Arti wherein he said that when the Lord is Omnipresent and Omnipotent, how I can worship him with a small set of lamps and incense. He ought to be worshipped as grandly as his grandeur deserves. Guru Nanak Dev ji sang an Arti in his melodious voice, describing how the entire sky is the platter on which the sun and moon are lamps for worship. The stars and the planets are the gems and pearls, the mythical Mount Meru, covered with sandalwood trees is the incense and the wind blowing from all directions is the grand fan for the beloved.

Gagan mein thaal rav chand dipak bane, tarika mandal janak moti,
dhoop malyanlo pavan chavro
kare saal banray phulant joti, kaisi arti hoye
bhav khandna teri arti. Anhata Shabad Vajanta bheree

The sky is the puja thaal (platter used for the artis), in which the sun and the moon are the diyas (lamps) The stars and planets in the
constellations are your jewels
The wind, laden with sandal-wood fragrance, is the celestial fans
All the flowering fields, forests are radiance! O! What a wonderful Arti, this is!

You, are a destroyer of Fear,
The sound of Your Name, which is so subtle, that It goes unheard,
Resounds endlessly.
The priests and pilgrims had collected around Guru Nanak and they were thrilled to hear him sing such praises to the Lord. Nanak’s Arti conveyed that Natures tribute to the Creator was superior to any ritualistic oblation offered before images. His melody reverberated around the whole Temple and touched the hearts of one and all. The priests realised that they had an enlightened soul visiting them.
Guru Nanak then further described Jagannath in his exalted verse:

Sahas Tav Nain na na
Nain hai Tohey kau
Sahas moorat Nana Ik Tohee
Sahas Pad Bimal Na na
Ik Pad Gandh bin
Sahas Tav Gandh Iv
Chalat Mohee
Sabh Mah Jot Jot Hai Sohee
Tis Dat Chaanan Sabh Mah Chaanan Hoi Gur Sakhi Jot Pragat Hoi
Har Charan Kamal Makrand Lobhit Mano Ana Din Mohey Aayey Pyaasa Kirpaa Jal Dey Nanak Sarang Kau Hoi Jaatey Terey nai Vaasa
Jo Tis Bhaavey So Aarti Hoi

You have a thousand eyes, forms, feet, noses… And you have none…
I am charmed !
Your Light enlightens all !
It is by the Grace of the Guru that the real Light (Knowledge) Manifests.
What pleases the Almighty is this Aarti (Creation) I yearn for Your Lotus feet, Night and day, Nanak is like the thirsty bird that asks,
For a drop of water, From You O Lord !
That drop (Grace) will make Nanak find comfort, In the uttering of Your Name.

This original Arti was composed by Guru Nanak himself though later four more stanzas were added. However the depth of thought that is conveyed in these few words makes it one of the best compositions of Godhead and nature.
In describing Jagannath’s form, Nanak describedHimsayingthat youhavenoeyes,but I can feel your penetrating gaze, you have no hands, but I can feel the all encompassing embrace of your love, you have no nose but I can feel the warmth of your breath, you have no ears but I know that you can hear my yearnings, you have no feet but I dream of spending my days worshiping these lotus feet.
The Aarti was further appended by the versesof Bhagat Ravi Das Ji who incidentally ,was a cobbler by profession. He too was a mystic Bhakti Saint whose writings have been included in the Sikh Holy Book Guru Granth Sahib. The following lines were added to the Arti from his works:

Naam Tero Aarti Majan Muraarey
Har Kay Naam Bina Joothey Sagal Pasaarey Naam Tero Aasno Naam Tero Ursaa Naam Tero Kesro Lay Chhitkaarey Naam Tera Ambhula Naam Tero Chandno Ghas Japey Naam Lay Tujahee Kau Chaarey Naam Tera Deeva Naam Tera Baatee Naam Tero Tel Lai , Maahee Pasaarey Naam Terey Kee Jyot Lagaayee Bhaiyaa Ujiyaaro Bhavan Saglaarey Naam Teraa Taagaa Naam Phul Maalaa Bhaar Athaarah Sagala Joothaarey Tero Keeyaa Tujhahee kyaa arpau Naam Tera Tuhee Chavar Dhulaarey Das Atha Atha Sathey Chaarey Khaanee Ehay Vartan Hai Sagal Sansaare Kahay Ravdaas Naam Tero Aartee
Sat Naam Har Bhog Tuhaarey

O Lord, Your name is the Aarti,
Your name is the Flower, the saffron, and the sandalwood That is offered to You.
Your Name is the (Deeya)
The Lamp, the oil and the cotton
That is lighted in it.

With the Light that Your Name gives out, The whole world is brightened.
Your Name is the Thread and Your Name is also The Flowers that are strung into that thread. All that I offer to You is Yours.
Your Name is the flywhisk, that you use, The (Chant of Your) True Name,
We offer to You,
All is false except Your Name !

The glory of the Arti was further enriched with the addition of the verses of Sant Sain, who too was a mystic saint of humble origins. He was a barber in the court of Raja Ram, the King of Rewa.
WhatisthebestArti orformofadoration of the Lord is the theme of Sain’s verses incorporated in the Guru Granth Sahib. According to Sain singing of God’s praise and meditating constitute the highest worship.

Dhoop Deep Dhrit Saaj Aartee Vaarney Jaau Kamlapati Mangalaa Har Mangalaa
Nit Mangal Raaja Raam Raaiko Uttam Deeyaraa Nirmal Baatee Toohee Niranjana Kamlaapati Raam Bhagat Raamaananda Jaaney Pooran Paramaananda Bakhaaney Madana Moorata Bhay Taarey Govindey Sain Bhanay Bhaj Paramaananda

The Aarti is adorned by the lighted lamp And the fragrance of the incense.
All is Auspicious.
Thou art the Supreme and Pure Light. Thou art the Lord of the Goddess of Wealth. My obeisance to Thee.
And to the Lord Rama, Beautiful Govinda, Who is described as Replete Pure Bliss !
Sain prays to Thee, Who obliterates all Fear.

Aarti was further illuminated by incorporating the words of Sant Kabir, the greatest of the proponents of the Bhakti Cult. Needless to say, Sant Kabir was a humble Muslim weaver, who like Guru Nanak took the lonely road and travelled far and wide
spreading his simple and humble words of humaneness and compassion.

Sun Sandhyaa Teree Dev Devaakar AdhPati Aadee Samaayee
Sidh Samaadhee Anta Naheen Paayaa Laagee Rahey Sarnaayee
Leho Aartee Ho Purakh Niranjan Satguru Poojo Bhaai
Thaada Brahmaa Nigam Bichaarey Alakh Na Lakhiyaa Jaayee
Tat Tel Naam Keeyaa Baatee Deepak Deh Ujiyaaraa
Jyot Laayee Jagadeesha Jagaaiyaa Boojhey Boojhana Haaraa Panchey Sabada Anaahada Baajey Sangey Saaringa Paanee Kabeer Daas Teree Aartee Keenee Nirankaar Nirbaanee

Dear Lord!
The Greatest of Yogis have not been able to comprehend You,
Those who worship the unmanifest,
Fail to realise You.
Even though they have persevered in their quest. Your Name resounds unheard (By the worldly) And only He can hear (On who Your Grace descends) Pray to Your Satguru! Almighty Lord! Accept the Aarti, with the oil lit with the Chant of Your Name, By You, the Lord of the Universe! Kabirdas performs the Aarti of the ‘Beyond
Description’ and the ‘Without Form’

Bhagat Dhanna was a simple Jat farmer from Rajasthan from whose works the following lines were added to the Arti.

Gopaal Teraa Aartaa
Jo Jan Teree Bhagat Karantey Tin Key Kaaj Sanvaartaa Dal Seedhaa Maangau Ghee Hamraa Khusee Karey Nit Jee Pania Chaadan Neekaa Anaaj Maangau
Gau Bhais Maangau Laaveree Ik Taajana Turee Changeree Ghar Kee Geehanee Changee Jan Dhanaa Levey Mangee Gopaal Tera Aartaa
Hey Dayaal Teraa Aartaa

Which means:
O Gopaala, (Accept) your Aarti!
You grant the wishes of those who worship You!
I ask for my basic sustenance (food, oil, lentils, good quality grains)
Which makes me feel fulfilled.
I also pray for a good wife, good clothes, good grain, a horse, a cow…

The final touches to this great composition were given by none other than the tenth Guru Gobind Singh Ji,


Yaa Tey Prasann
Bhayey Hain Mahaa Muni
Devan Key Tap Mein Sukh Paavey
Jag Karey Ik Ved Rarey
Bhav Taap Harey
Mili Dhyaan Hi Laavey
Jhaalar Taal Mrudanga Upanga
Rabaab Leeyey
Sur Saaj milaavey
Kinnar Gandharva Gaana Karey
Gani Jachha Upachhara Nirata Dikhaavey Sankhana kee Dhunee Ghantan kee Kari Phoolan Kee Barkhaa Barsaavey
Aartee Kot Karey Sur Sunder
Pekh Purandar Key Bali Jaavey Daanatee Dachhan Dey Key Pradachhan Bhaal Mein Kum Kum Achhan Laavey
Hot Kulaahal DevPuree mil Devan KeyKuli Mangal Gaavey
Aisey Chand Partaap Tey Devan Badhyo Prataap Teen Lok Jai Jai Karey Rarei Naam Sat Jaap Sagal Dwaar Ko Chaad Key Gahyo Tumhaaro Dwaar Baanh Gahey Kee Laaj Rakh Govind Daas Tuhaar Aagya Bhayee Akaal Kee Tabhee Chalaayo Panth Sabh Sikhan Ko Hukum Hai Guru Maaniyo Granth Guru Granth Jee Maaniyo Pragat Guraa Kee Deh Jaa Kaa Hirdaa Shudh hai Khoj Shabad Mei Leih Vaanee Guru Guru Hai Baanee Vich Baanee Amrit saarey
Gurbaanee Kahey Sevak Jan Maaney Partakh Guru Nistaarey

The Lord is pleased by the penance, prayers, rituals recitation of the Scriptures, Meditation, music, dance of the Celestial Beings, adorned with vermilion, various musical instruments, Ringing of bells and the showering of flowers, and the tune of the Aarti . The cosmic worlds rejoice and chant the Divine Name.
I have come to Your door-step O Lord, having left the world behind, Protect me, I am in Your service. Because of the Lord’s command, this order (Sikhism) Came into being.
The Sikhs are urged to believe that the Granth is the Guru manifest, Whoever is pure in heart, will find the answers within the words of the Guru Granth Sahib. Its words are the Guru, and the Guru is in the Guru Granth’s Utterings,
And within the words is the nectar (Of knowledge) And the words urge disciples to believe in the Guru

Thusthe completeArtithatissungtoday has in reality been composed by two Gurus, a cobbler, a barber, a weaver and a farmer, all from humblestock.Thisis proof enough thatSikhism believes in the equality of all humankind. The Guru Granth is an ecstatic pouring of a Spiritual Heart.
In this Arti, Guru Nanak described what he saw and experienced, yet even to him it was a very difficult task, because when it came to describing the Lord, words failed him.

Awal Allah noor upaya Kudrat ke sab bandey Ek noor te sab jag upjaya Kaun bhale ko mande.

‘First of all, God created light;
Mother Nature created all human beings equal; from that one Light the entire world came into being; so how do we differentiate that one is better than the other ?’

I find it rather sad and intriguing that connection of Guru Nanakji and the Guru Granth Sahib in particular and Sikhism in general with the Jagannath Temple is little known. Nanak did visit many of the holy spots during his first Udasi, but the impact that Jagannath had on him and his belief is reflected in the Guru Granth Sahib and his later writings and preaching.

Another little known and important fact that has remained unsung is the influence of Jayadeva’s work the “Geet Govinda” in the Guru Granth Sahibji. Two hymns composed by Jayadeva have been incorporated in the Guru Granth Sahibji. It is evident that these hymns found their way to the Sikh religion due to the profound influence that Jayadeva had on Guru Nanak during the latter’s visit to Puri.

The Bauli Mutt and the Mangu Mutt at Puri both have the Holy Guru Granth Sahib and the relevance to the Guru’s visit is recorded. While on his deathbed in 1839 Maharaja Ranjit Singh willed the Kohinoor to the Jagannath Temple. Bhai Himmat Singh from Puri was one of the five disciples popularly known as ‘Panch Pyare’. Odisha has seen the thriving of different religions in all their forms from ancient to modern times. Hinduism, with its various aspects like Saivism, Saktism, Vaishnavism, Buddhism, Jainism, Christianity and Islam have all thrived and gained relevance in the State. Good research will definitely bring into notice the relevance of Puri and Lord Jagannath in the Sikh history and religion.

The story of bravery and valour Of Afghan Girl Qamar Gul

A teenage girl has become a hero in Afghanistan for fighting off a Taliban attack, killing two militants with the AK-47 her father taught her to use before he was killed by the insurgent group. Now Qamar Gul, who is about 15, has been invited to the presidential palace and has already been lauded by President Ahsraf Ghani for her bravery.

Gul recounted the night last week when the terrorists came to her house in the village of Geriveh and forced their way in.

“It was around 1 a.m. that the Taliban knocked on our door. My mother answered and refused to open the door. They broke our door and dragged my parents into the hallway and killed them both,”

Gul grabbed her father’s rifle, which he had taught her to use, and opened fire. Two Taliban insurgents were killed in the shooting and another wounded, according to both Gul and the district governor.

Villagers soon rushed over to and together they forced the Taliban to retreat. 

“I am proud I killed my parents’ murderers,” I killed them because they killed my parents, and also because I knew they would come for me and my little brother.”

”After I killed the two Taliban, I went to talk to my parents, but they were not breathing,” she said, “I feel sad I could not talk to them one last time.”

Muhammad Rafiq Alam, the head of the local Taywara district, said Gul’s father, Arbab Shah Gul, had been a staunch government supporter and head of the village council of elders, making him a target for the insurgents.

“The village is located around 25 miles from the district center, and under government control. We arrived in the village in the morning and buried Qamar Gul’s parents,” Alam said.

Social media users have lauded Gul, and some have voiced concern for her safety.

“The brave action of #Qamargul is a clear message of all Afghan women to terrorists,” tweeted Munera Yousufzada, the country’s Deputy Defense Minister. “The Taliban should know that women in the current two decades are not the women of silence and tolerance, and they want nothing less than their rights.”

Gul told Press that she was looking forward to meeting the president.

“My life and my family’s life is in danger. I want the government to protect our people and us, so we can live in peace,” she said. 

Provincial Governor Noor Muhammad Kohnaward told Press that Gul had been moved to a safe location, and that she would soon leave for Kabul to visit President Ghani.

Afghan Sikhs: persecution, resistance & life after migration- Account of a migrant.

Gurdwara Karte Parwan in Kabul

Sanmeet Kaur shares her personal experiences of life as an Afghan Sikh in the UK

When you type the words ‘Afghan Sikh’ into a search engine, you will most likely be presented with the following headlines: ‘Why are Afghan Sikhs desperate to flee to the UK?’ Afghan Sikhs: one of the most vulnerable minorities in the world’. In August 2014 the plight of this small community hit national headlines when thirty-five immigrants were discovered stowed in a shipping container at Tilbury Docks in Essex. One man was found dead whilst others were taken to hospital suffering from severe dehydration and hypothermia. I remember reading the story and feeling a horror that I hadn’t felt in a while. It was reminiscent of my own journey to the UK. A story of being stowed away in similar circumstances and being detained even though we had committed no crime other than to run from the devastation orchestrated by the very countries now desperately trying to close their borders. This is the story of my people and it is one that remains largely untold.

Growing up in the UK, I always struggled to understand my heritage. How could I be Afghan if the majority of the Afghans were Muslim? How could I be Afghan if I spoke Punjabi, a language spoken by Sikhs with its roots in India? If religion played such a huge factor in deciding which diaspora I belonged to, it made most sense for me to turn to the Punjabi community as we shared the same faith of Sikhism. However I found this was complicated by the fact that my spoken Punjabi did not match theirs. Unlike most Sikhs, Afghan Sikhs speak a unique dialect known as ‘Kabli’, which is an amalgamation of Persian Dari and Punjabi. Over time I learnt to stop looking outwards and to instead focus on the Afghan Sikh diaspora as one that stood its own ground. I came to realise that the Afghan Sikh community faced dual persecution as Afghans fleeing decades of wars waged on their land and as Sikhs fleeing religious persecution as one of the smallest religious minorities in the country.

My family came to the UK when I was 5 years old and growing up I did my best to ‘assimilate’. Until recently I hardly ever thought about my background. I was too busy trying to be ‘British’. I would insist on only listening to English music, refuse to go to Southall because it was full of ‘freshies’ and hated every time I had to wear traditional clothes. As I reached my twenties and became to question my identity and place in the world, it struck me that nobody knew about my people.

Having studied history at university, I threw myself into research but was disappointed to find little other than a few articles on our journeys to the West. To the outside world it is almost as if we didn’t exist until we landed here. My questions about my community’s history remain largely unanswered. For now, I have only the stories that my family recount to me. Often these stories speak of events that affected the Sikh community as a whole, such as the 1984 Sikh massacre in India. My dad recalls how the murder of thousands of Sikhs in their own homeland affected those outside of India and hardened the perception of the Indian state as one that does little to respect minority rights.

At other times, his anecdotes are unique to the Afghan diaspora. For example, one of my favourite facts about my dad is that he can speak Russian. My dad was 10 years old when Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1979. His most formative years were spent under Soviet rule so it came as no surprise when he reached working age that he took frequent trips to Moscow where he worked in the trading industry. Quite amusingly, to my grandparents’ generation the word ‘Russian’ is synonymous with ‘foreign’ so whenever I speak English around them, I’m often asked to translate from ‘Russian’ to ‘Kabli’.

As a religious minority in Afghanistan, Sikhs face severe persecution. Treated as second-class citizens, few attend mainstream school and many frequently face verbal and physical attacks, their un-cut hair and proud turbans instantly marking them out as different. As a teenager, my mum recalls going to the Gurdwara on Vaisakhi, a key event in the Sikh calendar, when the Afghan guardsmen at the gates revealed the guns hidden underneath their shawls and began to indiscriminately shoot at the crowd. She had grabbed her baby brother and lay on the ground pretending to be dead. I have tried to search for any official recording of these events but again nothing appears. Their suffering does not exist on paper.

That is not to say the good times did not exist. For me, my parents’ wedding video is perhaps the best testament to this. My parents got married in Gurdwara Karte Parwan, one of the few Sikh temples remaining in Kabul. Neighbours, both Muslim and Hindu, came along to festivities held at my grandparents’ house. My favourite image of Kabul is that of a car adorned with flowers driving my parents home from the Gurdwara, with the Hindu Kush Mountains visible in the background and the popular 1992 Bollywood song ‘Kabhi Bhoola Kabhi Yaad Kiya’ accompanying the scene.

Gurdwara Karte Parwan in Kabul (Photo, Wikimedia).

The Afghan Civil War (1989-1992) and the advent of the Mujahedeen and later the Taliban, brought along a new wave of persecution and terror that would see hundreds of Sikhs fleeing their homes. The horrors of the war had been accompanied by a rise of fundamentalist ideology, which forced many to mark themselves as different in public. Although the rights of minority religions are protected under the Afghan constitution, the Taliban made Sikhs and Hindus publicly identify themselves by wearing yellow patches on their clothing as well as having to mark their homes, businesses and places of worship with a yellow flag.

In the years since my family left, the rising intolerance towards the minority group has seen attacks on the Sikh funeral custom of cremation. As cremation is a practice forbidden in Islam, Sikh funerals have been a focal point of dispute, with protestors frequently disrupting funeral processions. Alongside this homes and land have been illegally confiscated, leaving an already weakened community facing near-extinction. Although no official census exists, community leaders estimate that in the 1990s nearly 50,000 Sikhs lived in Afghanistan. Today, fewer than 400 families remain.

As the refugee crisis came to the fore in 2015 I remember watching in despair at the humanity afforded to the most vulnerable minorities in our country. Afghan refugees in particular are amongst those now most likely to have their requests for asylum rejected. Although the country is now deemed ‘safe’ by the Home Office, a UN report released in July 2017 revealed that the number of civilian deaths in the Afghan war has reached a record high, with the Taliban’s homemade bombs resulting in 40% of civilian causalities in just the first sixth months of 2017. For minority groups such as the Afghan Sikhs, this is compounded by the fact that their religion makes them an instant target for other forms of violence. In 2012 the Guardian reported on the distressing case of 23-year-old Afghan Sikh, Baljit Singh, who was deported to Afghanistan by the British government. Upon arrival he was taken aside by Afghan officials and imprisoned for 18 months without a conviction. His crime, he was told informally, was that he was falsely claiming to be Afghan. In prison he was verbally and physically attacked; his turban kicked off his head and at one point he even had boiling water thrown in his face. After months of appeals, he was finally allowed to return to the UK.

In Britain, the majority of Afghan Sikhs live in London and often come together in Southall, where the local Gurdwaras act as a focal point. The customs of home have continued into a foreign land. At weddings Afghan music blasts from the speakers and guests wear a mixture of traditional Indian and Afghan clothing. At home we regularly eat Afghan food including ‘bolani’, a baked flatbread with a vegetable filling, to my favourite, ‘mantu’, a meat-stuffed dumpling. My dad still listens to the songs of Ahmad Zahir, a popular Afghan singer often referred to as the ‘The Elvis of Afghanistan’ whose gravestone was reportedly destroyed by the Taliban shortly after they seized Kabul in 1996. As much as I grew up confused about my Afghan heritage, all these things make it hard for me to reject my roots.

When a close family member passed away last year, one of the first thoughts that ran through my mind was that he never had the chance to return to his homeland. He left Afghanistan not knowing he would never return. But his story lives on through us: the Afghan Sikh community.

The account is of Sanmeet Kaur who is a recent history graduate and aspiring writer from London. She has written for gal-dem zine and enjoys all things books, politics and intersectional feminism. Twitter: @sanmeeet

Forced Conversions in British Sikh Diaspora & silence around it.

The concern over ‘forced’ conversions believed to be initiated by ‘predatory’ Muslim males, who ‘groom’ Sikh ‘girls’ into converting to Islam against their will, continues to resurface within the British public eye. This narrative first emerged in late 1980s and early 1990s and has been reproduced to establish the threat of the Muslim ‘Other’. Such a discourse remains fixed within the Sikh social fabric as the tale continues to circulate within the collective despite a lack of evidence to support such claims.

Introduction

In August 2007, the BBC Asian Network broadcast a live discussion about ‘so called’ ‘forced’ conversions of Sikh (and Hindu) ‘girls’ to Islam following an article claiming that the police denied this was happening with no evidence or record of a single case to date.

1 The debate involved various people telephoning, many of them recalling stories from a friend of a friend they knew who had been coerced into converting to Islam and one girl recalled her own experience of being ‘lured’ away from Sikhism by a Muslim boy who tried to ‘groom’, ‘manipulate’ and ‘entrap’ her within the folds of Islam. This story is all too familiar within the Sikh community; such a narrative has been persistently reproduced to warn ‘vulnerable’ Sikh ‘girls’ about the ‘dangers’ of ‘predatory’ Muslim men, a tale that has become deeply embedded within the Sikh imagination, a myth that continues to resurface within the public eye, readily consumed by the diaspora.

2 One must question, for what reasons does this particular story remain so integral within the Sikh community? Why are Muslims thought to pose such a threat to the Sikh identity? Moreover, why has this narrative remained so prominent and subscribed by so many Sikhs in the absence of police or other evidence to support such claims?

Sikh narratives on ‘forced’ conversions

The ‘forced’ conversions narrative is enunciated in a variety of sites, journalistic, popular and alas, even academic:
In recent years, the organization of religious and political extremism (inaccurately termed ‘fundamentalism’) has taken place both on and off educational premises. This presentation of political ideology under the guise of religious orthodoxy attempts to recruit and mobilize young men to become perpetrators of violence. For example, leaflets circulated in Bradford exhorting young Muslim men to rape Sikh women and murder homosexuals are traceable to extremist Islamic organizations operating across the UK, but funded from outside it. (Macey 857)

Reading this somewhat sensational account in which Muslim males are allegedly ‘urged’ to rape Sikh women, could either be interpreted as an effort to instil and encourage a fearless denouncement of ‘predatory’ Muslim males, or as a symptom of the banal way in which
Islamophobia circulates. Similar statements can be seen featured on many Sikh/Hindu websites and organizational literature, and right-wing media articles collectively these texts present the same narrative structure in which ‘vulnerable Sikh girl’ is ‘coerced, manipulated and groomed’ into the ‘folds’ of Islam by the ‘Muslim male sexual predator’. Such accounts are widely available and continue to resurface within the British Sikh diaspora.

The structure of the ‘forced’ conversions narrative is along the lines of a script with friends and enemies, heroes and villains. This is the story of the ‘brave and courageous’ Sikhs trying to save ‘their girls’ from the ‘Muslim oppressor’ whose only agenda is to ‘coercively’ convert through means of ‘trickery, lies, deceit and manipulation’. Interestingly, Sikh men converting were not seen as a problem as testified in the interviews, for example, the following was a common response:

I don’t know of even one Sikh boy who’s converted, its mainly girls because for Muslims we are kaffirs, we are their enemy, so the way to get to us is to take the girls because they know that it’s the biggest insult and dishonour if the girl runs away because girls are the respect of the family and that’s why they target them and not boys; they see Sikh girls as easy and they call them things like slags. (Interview 1, Sikh male, 40 years old, community leader)

According to the corpus, the basic stages of conversion are expressed as follows:
• Sikh girl is away from home and family as she goes to university or college, she gains her independence/freedom and starts to go out drinking and clubbing.
• Muslim man befriends her disguised as a Sikh. He uses a Sikh name or wears the Kara, and even drinks, to fool the girls into thinking that he is Indian/Sikh. According to this type of narrative the Muslim man is given an incentive; for every girl he converts there is a cash prize and a secured place in heaven (despite his drinking).
• They form a relationship where the girl is ‘groomed’; they fall in love and when emotionally attached he reveals his true Muslim identity. The cracks begin to show as she is being pressured to convert to Islam; family ties are cut, and she is trapped.
• She tries to escape but compromising photos have been taken of her to use as blackmail, or she is impregnated, thus cannot risk shaming the community. •She is beaten and then taken to Pakistan where they spend rest of their lives as slave

Narrative is strengthened by accounts like “Since I’ve come to university I’ve heard from my mates in Birmingham and Leicester about Muslim guys trying to convert Sikh girls, they’ve told me Muslim guys will go out wear the Kara and even wear a turban and have a fake Sikh name and then obviously when they go out
they’ll chat to Sikh girls and stuff and then Sikh girls will obviously think they’re Sikh guys
and slowly they’ll get manipulated. (Interview 5, Sikh male, 20 years old, student)

The sexualisation element underlying the narrative combined with notions of manipulation are features which are particularly stressed by the respondents:

It is bad if how Muslims convert Sikhs is done how I’ve been told, which is by manipulating them pretending to be Sikh; I’ve seen on the Internet a Muslim guy saying how much he hates Sikhs, he’s got a list with pictures of all the girls he’s tried to convert with their names, there’s about 25 of them, saying what he’s done to them sexually and what he plans to do to them again sexually, it’s been taken down obviously. (Interview 2, Sikh male, 19 years old, student)

The notion of disguise, the phases of entrapment and the ‘grooming’ process combine to construct the specific agenda thought to be in practice by Muslims in their ‘mission’ to convert Sikh ‘girls’:

In Bradford you see like so many Muslim guys who will come to Sikh parties with Karas on so they look basically like they’re Sikh, like if you’ve got cut hair you can’t tell, so if you’ve got a Kara on you could be a Sikh, and then if a girl falls for it and gets emotionally attached to the Muslim there’s only so much you can do, like a distant Sikh relative of mine, the same thing happened to her; a Muslim guy took her and she’s now left her family and they miss her so much but can’t do anything ’cos she’s like living in London with him and no one knows really where she is ’cos they’ve cut all ties from the family, he met her in a party, this is what they do they’ll go out dance with them, take their number and carry on playing this game that they’re a Sikh and then when the girl gets emotionally attached he’ll say actually I’m not a Sikh but then it’s too late, you hear so many stories that the girls even get shipped off to Pakistan and they get forgotten about and they get treated badly. (Interview 7, Sikh male, 22 years old, student)

The respondents clearly identify the stages of the ‘forced’ conversion narrative. What emerges from this story is an emphasis on the sexual ‘predatory’ nature of the Muslim men who are described as preying on ‘young vulnerable Sikh girls’. The construction, then, of Sikh females within this discourse is key. When asked about portrayals of Sikh women in British society the following was a fairly typical response:

I think Sikh girls are represented as being quite independent and educated ’cos the majority of us will go to university and work hard, I think sometimes though we are also seen as people who drink a lot and go out a lot which is not so good, especially when you see some of the girls and the stuff they wear like short skirts, that doesn’t make us look good, but generally I think we are represented well because we integrate and adapt well in Britain. (Interview 14, Sikh female, 27 years old, young professional)

The respondents appear to express the danger of over-exposure to Anglo-British society, which is thought to lead to excessive drink and promiscuity amongst Sikh girls:

I think generally Sikh girls are largely seen as hard-working, clever, independent and modern, but then some Sikh girls have been masked from social society [sic] by their parents with an over-protective upbringing; this has resulted in their increasing anger and annoyance and once given the opportunity of freedom have grasped it in a rebellious way and gone to extreme lengths of doing all things frowned upon within Sikh culture and do such things rather than moderation like drinking and going out. (Interview 10, Sikh male, 25 years old,
young professional)

‘Forced’ conversions, the ‘war on terror’ and Islamophobia

As the story goes, we have the idea of Muslim puppet-masters secretly financing young Muslim men to seduce Sikh women. We have ideas of secret messages from the Qur’an, which all Muslims are programmed to obey. We have the idea that mainstream non-Muslim societies are subverted or threatened by Muslim powers to comply with ‘predatory’ practices of Muslim men. The figure, then, of the Sikh female body and the ‘predatory’ Muslim male helps to account for the homogeneity of the Sikh community, which it lacks due to migratory displacements. This antagonistic discourse subscribed to by sections of the Sikh diaspora represents or purports to explain a potential loss and by using the available narratives of Mughal persecution and partition turmoil, they can continue to re-describe their situation to identify themselves as Sikhs in Britain. In other words, these Sikh narratives represent both the possibility of a Sikh identity and the failure of that possibility to be fully realized. The failure of Sikhism fully to constitute Sikh subjects in the conditions of the diaspora is represented through the presence of a Muslim antagonist.

The Mughals saw us (Sikhs) as a threat ’cos it was something different and saw these fresh and modern ideas people started picking up on so they thought look they’re attracting so much attention so they’re gonna take people away from that community and create their own, so they saw it as a threat and they wanted to subvert that threat before it developed; I think that’s why there was that conflict at those times and it’s sad that they haven’t changed even today.(Interview 26, Sikh male, 35 years old, community leader)

The ‘forced’ conversion narrative has been articulated as a phenomenon rooted in the past; such a construction works to establish a clear dichotomy of the ‘friend’ and the ‘foe’:

Aurangzeb was spreading the word of hatred and death so that Sikhism would be wiped out. Having failed to do so, Aurangzeb then moved on to getting his followers to rape and kill Sikh women whose families failed to convert to Islam. So they were basically opposed to Sikhs because Sikhs stood for everything they didn’t, they opposed our teachings, our faith and ultimately our message of equality which went against their beliefs. (Interview 3, Sikh female 28 years old, young professional)

Similarly the Partition narratives echo the same notion of the Muslim ‘enemy’ as ‘oppressing, abusing and forcefully converting’ the Sikh collective:

Women during partition were sacrificed in name of Sikhism to prevent the religion dying out and being taken over; these women and the families should be respected because they didn’t allow Muslims to rape and convert them, instead they sacrificed their lives. (Interview 8, Sikh female, 33 years old, young professional)

The Sikh community is distinct, and popular images of Sikhs in the West have often portrayed them as a gallant and courageous ‘martial race’,as victims of racial discrimination, as activists dedicated to their faith, and as talented and educated businessmen (Singh and Tatla 9). This contrasts to those experiences of ‘BrAsian’ Muslims for example, studies have suggested that Muslims in Britain are more likely to suffer from poorer housing conditions, possess poorer health and are more likely to be unemployed within the labour market compared to their Sikh (and Hindu) counterparts (Abbas 10). Moreover, education studies have also shown that ‘the Muslim percentage of those with higher educational qualifications was just below the England and Wales average (13.5% versus 14.3%). For Sikhs however it was 17%’ (Abbas 30)

There’s no problems or conflict with the British community; Sikhs integrate a lot better, a lot more Sikhs have well spoken English and get along with British culture, whereas Muslims you get a lot of them that don’t even speak English and they keep themselves to themselves in their own small little communities, they just wanna stick to that. (Interview 29, Sikh male, 23 years old, student)
Sikhs are willing to get on with everyone, they work hard and do well in Britain, but Muslims don’t want to adapt or change, they will say that they’re Pakistani or Muslim first before they say they’re British; a lot of Sikhs will say they’re British first. (Interview 10, Sikh male, 25 years old, young professional)

The focus of the ‘forced’ conversion narratives on the ‘predatory’ Muslim males allows these stories to be inserted as a Sikh chapter in the development of the current wave of Islamophobia. This of course does not mean that these ‘forced’ conversion narratives and the antipathy towards the figure of the Muslim are simply the consequences of the ‘war on terror’ or the Mughal atrocities nor should they be seen as lying dormant waiting for the events of 9/11 or 7/7 to ignite them. Forced conversions and grooming of Sikh girls therefore should be kept separate from the current narrative of islamophobia or the mix up of Sikh history, both no doubt have a role to play but if mixed in one bag give huge opportunities to some people to bring down the victims of forced conversions and delay the justice giving the perpetrators a free hand to carry on with their agenda.

NB- The article has been reproduced with permission from A Case study by University of Leeds under Katy P Lian in magazine ‘South Asian Popular Culture’

The Resistance Front (TRF) and Social media Proxy War against India.

Despite the imposition of some of the most pervasive physical and digital restrictions anywhere in the world, India’s northernmost state of Jammu and Kashmir has yet again erupted in another cycle of violence. The insurgency that has raged across the state since at least July 1989 is now being fueled by “The Resistance Front” (TRF), a new and reportedly Pakistan-backed terror outfit targeting Indian security services and people trying to establish democracy in J&K

While the world’s attention was fixated on combating the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Islamabad’s strategy of using proxy forces to engage in asymmetric warfare appears to have been renewed with the creation of TRF and the improved mobility for operatives attempting to infiltrate via the mountainous terrain along the Line of Control (LOC), the de facto border between the two countries. As with other terror groups operating in the region, TRF has adapted to the proliferation of digital communication by adopting social media insurgency tactics.

The Resistance Front is one of the first major terror groups founded in direct opposition of the BJP-led Central Governments unilateral revocation of Article 370 on August 5, 2019.

Following the introduction of sweeping amendments to the legal provisions governing the autonomy and administrative status of the state, the Indian government deployed additional troops to the region and instituted a comprehensive physical and digital lockdown, which is still in place more than 300 days later.

In spite of these restrictions, online activity by extremist groups in the state continued unabated, with many turning to virtual private networks (VPNs) to bypass the government measures. This in turn raised questions regarding the efficacy of imposing such sweeping measures in the state that have caused severe inconvenience to ordinary citizens while remaining ineffective at curbing terrorism related activities.

TRF maintains an active presence on multiple major platforms, including Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, and Telegram. They leverage the popularity of the platforms among Kashmiri locals, as well as the end-to-end encryption feature offered by some of them, to magnify their attacks, provide regular updates on their activities on ongoing counter-insurgency operations in the state, amplify propaganda venerating their fallen members, and urge locals to take up arms against India and non kashmiri labourers.

An analysis of the group’s online behavior over the month of April 2020 — during which the outfit claimed a series of high-profile attacks targeting Indian forces deployed the state — emphasized the importance accorded by the TRF to social media insurgency, with the active dissemination of propaganda mirroring and complementing the real-world violence carried out by its members.

First appearing on social media platforms as early as October 2019, TRF gained the attention of local media after claiming responsibility for a grenade attack along Hari Singh High Street in the city of Srinagar that left one civilian dead and dozens injured, including three local policemen. Subsequently, the group went on to carry out a series of violent attacks over the month of October. TRF initially exhibited the same operational tactics and capabilities employed by other terror groups in the state, using indirect means of contact — usually grenade attacks and IEDs — to target local civilians and police officers.

In March 2020, Outlook India, a domestic publication, reported on how the group appeared on the radar of Indian security agencies after six of its members were arrested, uncovering a significant arms cache. Another Indian outlet, The New Indian Express, published an article highlighting how the interrogation of captured members revealed that they had received their instructions via a Pakistan-based operative known as “Andrew Jones” on Telegram and “Khan Bilal” on WhatsApp, two encrypted-messaging platforms.

From April 2020 onward, however, TRF began to claim a series of high-profile operations that saw members of the group switching from indirect means of targeting security services to using assault rifles to target directly Indian security services stationed in the state. This directly confrontational approach, alongside the presence of trained and battle-hardened militants among its cadre, further distinguished the tactics and operational capabilities of TRF from that of its peers in the valley.

Open-source data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, an independent Indian think tank, shows that the first five months of 2020 have already seen 43 violent incidents in the Jammu and Kashmir, leading to the death of 10 civilians, 74 insurgents, and 25 members of the armed forces.

TRF maintains an active presence on multiple terrorist channels, allowing them to disseminate propaganda via a range of digital platforms, including Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, and Twitter. Moreover, every attack by the group is quickly claimed and amplified via social media alongside posts containing stylized graphics and photographs memorializing the attacks, as well as threats of further violence.

Analysis of a now-deleted TRF Facebook page via CrowdTangle showed that, despite receiving little traction, the page received the highest interaction rate on April 26, 2020, and May 3, 2020, coinciding with days during which members of the group were involved in armed encounters in the state. Moreover, status updates announcing and claiming responsibility for attacks gained the highest traction reiterating the increasingly symbiotic nature of digital and physical violence in the operational strategy of terror groups in the region.

On April 5, 2020, the group claimed responsibility for an armed encounter between security forces and members of the group infiltrating across the LOC in Keran sector, Kupwara, which resulted in several deaths. The Keran encounter also reinforced Indian security services’ suspicions of the group being funded and trained from across the border, with three members killed in the encounter discovered to be locals from South Kashmir who had traveled to Pakistan on valid Pakistani visas and had been reported missing since 2018, over which time they received training and supplies from their handlers in Pakistan, according to a report by the Hindustan Times.

Stills taken from TRF video post attack

On April 18, 2020, the group gained further notoriety after ambushing a paramilitary vehicle in Sopore, Baramulla, killing three members of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and wounding two others. Finally, on May 2, 2020, TRF engaged in one of its most high-profile attacks, an armed encounter in Handwara, Kupwara, with a 12-hour siege that resulted in the death of five security servicemen, including a colonel, a major, and a sub-inspector of the local police. Less than 24 hours later, the group struck again, on May 4, during which a lone member ambushed a patrol of CRPF servicemen in Sopore, Baramulla, killing three and injuring two other

In addition to expounding the same ideologies and tactics as Pakistan-backed terror groups in the valley, TRF exhibits a degree of coordination with such groups, using social media channels to cross-post propaganda and information about their attacks. Direct collusion is also postulated in an exchange between a member and the moderator in a WhatsApp group ostensibly meant for supporters of Ansar-Ghazwat Al-Hind (AGH), an affiliate of Al-Qaeda in the state. In the text exchange, a member asked, “Who is the TRF?” with another member with the screen name “Cobra” responding that “TRF is the organization that joins all the other groups together. Apart from AGH and ISJK [Islamic State Jammu and Kashmir] all other groups are part of it. Although perhaps even the AGH is part of it, only God knows.” Another user going by the screen name “Haq Parast” asked the moderator, “How correct is this statement?” The moderator responded by confirming the prior statement while adding, “This is the most active group in Kashmir today.”

Further evidence of coordination is also provided by a post uploaded in TRF’s personal chat group on Telegram in the hours after the Handwara encounter on May 2, 2020. A user with the screen name “Faisal Shafi” posted a video of the final testimonial of two militants who allegedly represented “Pak brothers at Handwara encounter” with the message “Haider bhai” (brother Haider). While TRF’s subsequent posts glorifying the attack on its digital channels claimed that both militants killed in the attack were locals, this was refuted by a subsequent investigation by the local police.

A story published by the Hindustan Times, citing a report from Asia News International, reported that one of the casualties of the encounter was “Haider, a Pakistani terrorist belonging to the Lashkar-e-Taiba,” leading to speculation that TRF was a “shadow outfit” that was largely comprised of militants drawing from HM and LeT.

Post on TRF telegram channel showing HM & Lashkar-e-Tohiba together

Local security analysts believe that the formation of TRF represents an attempt by Islamabad to consolidate the “strengths, manpower, weaponry and training of various militant outfits into one group.” Accordingly, Indian strategists postulate that, by presenting TRF as an indigenous movement, Islamabad hopes to evade international pressure to cut off state support for proxy groups in the region brought on by its grey-listing by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Logo change with JK Fighters on dagger

In the aftermath of the high-profile Handwara encounter claimed by TRF, Indian security services stepped up counterterrorism operations in the state. On June 10, security officials announced the elimination of 22 terrorists over the first half of June, including eight commanders of militant outfits associated with the TRF. The casualties of the counterterrorism operations included high-profile insurgents such as Riyaz Naikoo, former commander of HM, and Adil Ahmad Wand, former commander of ISJK, signaling a recognition by the Indian security establishment that TRF represented one of the most potent proxy forces operating in the state.

The latest counterterrorism measures brought the number of insurgents killed by security forces in the state over the last six months up to 93. Despite the mounting death toll, India Today reported a spike in local terror recruitment over the same period, suggesting that the enduring conflict shows no sign of abating in the near future.

The resumption of violence in Jammu and Kashmir after the abrogation of Article 370 also signals the need for Indian security agencies to rethink their broader policy toward containing violence in the valley. This need for a new approach is particularly germane given that, despite imposing stringent restrictions on movement and digital communications in the state, terror groups continue to carry out attacks and utilize social media platforms to claim responsibility and amplify their extremist propaganda.

The Only Hindu in Afghanistan’s Khost area is all set to come to India.

Bagwan Dase, 75 is the only Hindu left in eastern Khost province.

The hundreds of others, he says, fled after warlords seized their homes and lands and “we fear to ask for the return of our properties”.

Dase sits in a Hindu temple in Prim Nagar village, east of Khost city. Before 1978, Prim Nagar was known as one of the most beautiful villages in the city, but after decades of war, it now lies in ruins.

Dase, who was born in Khost, stays because he has a job — securing the empty houses of the Hindus who have left — for which he receives 14,000 afghanis per month. He lives alone, because his family is in India.

Hindus and Sikhs have lived in Khost for centuries. They dress the same as Afghans, but worship different gods and speak a different language – although many do speak Dari and Pashto as well.

Sayed Amin Mujjahid, deputy of the Afghan Academy of Science, says that after Afghan King Mahmood Ghaznawi conquered India in 1025 and broke the Somanthe statues, he was followed back to Afghanistan by many Hindus and Sikhs.

“Then in the 1760s, during the reign of King Ahamd Shah Baba, some Hindus and Sikhs joined the army and also settled in Afghanistan.”

“The third reason that Hindus came to Afghanistan was that whenever the Hindus clashed with their government, they came to Afghanistan where the government gave them land and other privileges in areas now considered Pakistan,” Mujahid says.

The Hindu-Sikh population was estimated to number around 200,000 in 1990, but now there are between 700-800 now

Before the Communist regime in the mid 1970s, 243 Hindu families lived side by side with Afghans in Khost, Dase says.

However, after the 1978 coup, due to the poor security and restrictions on their ability to follow their religion, some Hindus left.

In contrast, when the Taliban took power in 1996, Sikhs and Hindus were free to practise their religion. They had no fear about security either. However, the Taliban did force them to wear yellow stars to make them easily distinguishable from Muslims.

When Dr. Najeebullah’s government collapsed in 1991 during the decade- long civil war, Base says his properties were looted. A Hindu temple in Khost also was destroyed in 1992, at the same time as some extremist Hindus demolished the Baber Mosque in India.

“Due to economic problems, Hindus from Khost emigrated to Pakistan, India and other parts of the world,” Dase says. Only 33 of the original families from Khost have remained in Afghanistan, and most are in Kabul, probably one of the safest places for Hindus and Sikhs.

Although some Hindu families remained in Khost, the lack of jobs, assaults by warlords on their properties and the worsening security forced them to move.

In Latako area, more than 187 acres of land belonging to Hindu families were seized by warlords, Dase says. He says if any of the land owners even contemplate asking for their property back, they will be kidnapped and threatened with death.

Royal Sang, the assistant of the Hindus Council in Afghanistan, says it is true that Dase is the only Hindu in Khost. He blames the seizing of their lands by warlords, the poor security and lack of jobs for why Hindus left Afghanistan.

According to him, another problem is lack of schools for Hindu children.

But life is not much better in India. “We are treated as Afghan refugees in India, we are not given any sort of privileges, we are not happy there. When Afghanistan becomes stable, we will return,” says Dase.

He wants the government to take their back their land from the warlords.

Yousef Molater, an official of Human Rights Association in the southeastern zone, says it is the government’s responsibility to protect the rights of Hindus.

“The Hindus are citizens of Afghanistan and they should be prevented from emigrating and the government has to provide opportunities for them to them return and live in safety,” he says.

Hindus have rights just like anyone else in the province and nobody can oppress them, Abdul Jabar Naeemi, the governor of Khost, says.

“If they have documents for grabbed lands in any part of the province, I will return their land to them,” he says.

However, although the Hindus say they have complained to the government, Naeemi denies this.

The governor says he hopes the Hindus will return to their former homes and take part in the reconstruction of the province.

Gen. Abdul Haqeem Eshaqzai, the police chief, also says that if the Hindus have any security-related problems, they can tell him and he will resolve it. But again, while the Hindus say they have complained to the police, the Eshaqzai denies this.

There have been some success stories. During the recent parliamentary election, two Sikhs stood for the lower house, and more recently a Hindu was selected to advise President Hamid Karzai on economic affairs.

Most Khost residents say they are saddened by the stories of torment that the Hindus suffer and would like them to be able to return.

Hajji Juma Khan,72, a resident of Sabari district, says he has good memories of the Hindus. “I wish the Hindus would return to our village. They were very good and harmless people,” he says.

Hasamuddin Rahimzai, a professor of the Islamic Sharia department at Khost University, says the harassment of Hindus was not only a violation of their human rights but also an act against Islam.

“What was done is in the past, but in the future I hope the Hindus who left Khost will return,” he says.

Bhagwan who is 75 now has his sons in Delhi and operate the Mobile accessories business in Karol Bagh area. Bhagwan says that he had the choice to move to Pakistan or India like his family but he decided to stay to preserve and take care of Hindu & Sikh religious places.

Bhagwan Das says that he is moving to India due to health reasons as he requires regular dialysis and also believes that new CAA law would expedite the process of getting Indian citizenship. He says “Our people went there (Delhi) and suffered for years without jobs and even basic documents to avail govt schemes but now that has changed. I stayed back to take care of our heritage but now that Sikhs from Afghanistan are ready to move out as well, I think it is time I bid farewell to my motherland. My last wish is to be cremated in Khost and I hope my sons will fulfil that for me.”

Note- The Article has not been modified or changed to correct the factual and historical inaccuracies and is presented as said by the people directly. For example a statement suggesting Sikhs existed in Afg during Ghaznavi’s times even before Guru Nanak’s birth is not authors suggestion. Also there are other inaccuracies in statements of some accounts in this story about when & how Hinduism arrived in Afghanistan

Is India the first choice of Afghan Sikhs? “The answer is ‘No.’”-Afghan Sikh Account

The Kabul attack killing 25 innocent souls have been a real shaker. The 25 March incident, followed by two consecutive days of more attacks in the Afghanistan capital have left the small band of the Sikh minority community living in heightened fear. Even before the attack, they were already almost living on egg shelfs.

What can the world community do to help the Sikh and Hindu minorities hammed by increasing attacks from the Muslim groups? At this point of time, leaving Afghanistan seems to be the only solution.

“It is too small a minority, unable to defend itself, and politically inconsequential. I’d still like to be able to help them get out, instead of having more killed,” Harpreet singh an afghan sikh who has settled in Canada.

Canada is one of the options but it does not seem to be working out just as yet. Some 26,000 Syrian were resettled in Canada between December 2015 and February 2016. But the route does not seem to be open for the Afghan Sikhs.

“Although we’re trying to put pressure on the Canadian government, unfortunately it is unlikely they will act,” Anarkali Kaur Said

Here are excerpts from the interview with Harpreet Singh with credible inputs from Anarkali Kaur

What is your view on the recent attacks on Sikhs in Kabul?

The Afghanistan situation is really alarming as there are constant threats, and we believe that further attacks are imminent, and there is insufficient security to protect them.

Is Canada their best hope to seek refuge? 

Although we’re trying to put pressure on the Canadian government, unfortunately it is unlikely they will act — very upsetting. Most likely, they’ll have to go to Pakistan or India — where they’ll be forced to languish as ‘non-citizens’ for many years. It’s very sad and frustrating.

Canadian leaders seem silent on the plight of the Afghan Sikhs. Is that proper reading of the situation?

Yes.

What are the ground challenges in getting the Afghan Sikhs to move out?

There are logistical issues, but we can charter a plane and bring them. Unlike the 20,000 Canadians stuck in India due to the curfew, we don’t have those movement restrictions in Afghanistan.  And these people we need to move are mostly in Kabul.

Beyond logistics. Does it mean they have to leave everything they have and start afresh?

Yes, there is no choice. But, those in the Gurdwara have already been driven out of their homes — and they would congregate each night at the Gurdwara for safety.

A few  Afghan Sikh families have moved to Canada some years earlier. What are their experiences ?

Only 15 families have made it here that were originally in Helmunt province — they all have jobs and are starting to get settled in. They’re not yet as established as the Kabuli Sikhs of Southhall, but that takes a generation.

The Afghan Sikhs in London are well established. They have flourishing businesses and real estate.

The Sikh-Afghani newcomers in Canada are living on rent, mostly uneducated (hence labour jobs). But they are safe and have a future.

If we bring them to Canada, then we’ll ensure they have jobs, training, education and support — starting fresh here will be easier than the risk they face in Kabul currently. Those that got out over the last couple of decades were generally those that could afford to get out, so, had some wealth. Those left behind are the most needy.

What can Sikhs in other countries do to help the Afghan Sikhs?

If there are immigration or refugee sponsorship programs in each respective country, then we should consider those too. Alternatively, help get signatures on the various petitions that are being circulated so that this becomes a global movement and the politicians respond to the pressure. And lastly, financially help the organizations that are working on this. World Sikh Parliament is not collecting any funds, we are routing our funds through other organizations.

Is it the end of the line for Sikhs in Afghanistan?

Sadly, that’s the case. It is too small a minority, unable to defend itself, and politically inconsequential. I’d still like to be able to help them get out, instead of having more killed.

Have you personally met any of the Afghan Sikhs who moved to Canada? What was your impression?

Yes. Good folk, grateful to be in Canada. They will make good Citizens of Canada. And they are our brothers, there’s an instant kinship when you meet them.

Despite a new Indian law offering them citizenship, most of the Sikh minority community members in Afghanistan would prefer to migrate to Canada or the U.K. or any western nation, if they have to leave their country at all.

Accounts from Afghanistan

“We have nowhere to go. Where can we poor people go?” Says Arijit Singh, an elderly Sikh in Kabul’s Shor Bazar locality.

“Afghanistan was and shall remain my country. I was born here and have lived through the ‘Shahi’ [monarchy] and the Khalqis [communist] the Mujahideen and the Taliban. I will die here as well,” he said.

Singh’s family has migrated from the central restive Ghazni province to the relatively safer Kabul. That is the case with many of the community members, as lawlessness coupled with the raging insurgency has forced them to take refuge in the capital city.

“Under the Taliban regime [1996 – 2001], we were asked to wear distinctive turbans and armbands and hoist a flag on our gurdwaras [Sikh houses of worship] to differentiate from Muslims. Sikhs also support long beards like many Afghans. Other than that, there was not much trouble,” he said. 

However, he added that over the years when the economy and security situation has turned worse, properties of the minority community have been encroached upon. 

Kuldeep Singh, a young Sikh living near Madawi market in the capital Kabul, said he would ideally like to migrate to Canada, the U.K., with his family to escape from the harsh realities of life in Afghanistan. “Most of our community members have left either for Canada, Europe, America, the U.K. and India,” he said.

“There was a time when we had thousands of families living here. But now only few hundreds are left”, he said. Over the years, due to migration to the west, neighboring Pakistan and India, their population has been reduced to few hundred families.

– Indian law to accelerate process of citizenship

Kuldeep added that those who went to India in the past had to camp inside gurdwaras for years, to get their documents processed. 

“Even after that, they continued to struggle to start a new life from the scratch with no or little support,” he said. The new Indian law is expected to make the process faster to process their citizenship, in case they opt to migrate to India.

He added that leaving the motherland can be a difficult decision. But the current situation in Afghanistan and persistent terrorist attacks, everyone including the majority Muslim population wants to escape to find a safe place.